Wednesday, April 29, 2009

TSN: Daniel Dennett

On Preaching & Teaching


ROGER BINGHAM: My guest today in the Science Studio is Dan Dennett, who is the professor of philosophy and co-director for the Center For Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, co-founder and co-director of the Curricula Software Studio at Tufts, and he helped design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. But more importantly he’s known as the author of many books, including most recently Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon.

So, Dan Dennett, let me just take you back to an interview, because this is Beyond Belief Two: Enlightenment 2.0. You were supposed to have been at the first meeting last year. There’s an interview that you did some time ago with our old friend, Susan Blackmore, where she asked you “I assume you don’t believe in God; do you think anything of the person survives physical death?”

You got very close to physical death about a year ago.

DANIEL DENNETT: I did, yeah.

BINGHAM: Would you like to recount that wonderful experience?

DENNETT: I had had a triple bypass in ‘99, but I was fine; I was in good shape. But then I had a so-called aortic dissection. My aorta, the main pipe from the heart up to the rest of the body, sort of blew out. It was held together by the scar tissue from the old operation; that’s what saved my life, first. And so I had that all replaced - I now have a Dacron aorta and a carbon fiber aortic valve, and I’m fine, as you can see. I survived that just wonderfully. And no, I didn’t have any religious experiences.

BINGHAM: Did your life flash before your eyes?

DENNETT: Not particularly, no. In the aftermath, I was tremendously grateful to be alive, and that’s when I realized that when I say thank goodness, I don’t mean that just as a euphemism for thank God; I mean thank goodness. There’s a lot of human goodness that we’ve accumulated over the ages, and that was what kept me alive, and that’s what I was grateful to.

BINGHAM: Tell me about your background, because what allowed you, do you think, to be in the situation where you didn’t reach out for any other kind of supernatural support system? How did you grow up? Were you grown up in a religious household, or?

DENNETT: I grew up in I think a very common kind of household in New England; I call it sort of suburban Protestantism. Very liberal, you can believe whatever you want, but you learn the hymns, I sang in the choir, I memorized psalms. I never took it too seriously, except briefly for a period in my teenage years, when I got very serious thinking about it, and then I just realized no, I was an atheist. But I love the King James Version, I loved the Christmas carols, I loved religious music, I liked a lot of religious art, and so forth.

BINGHAM: So, parents. Was there any science back then? How did you become a little philosopher?

DENNETT: No, if I’d had a scientific background in my parents, I think I would have been an engineer, because I’m sort of an engineer [unintelligible]. I love to figure out how things work, and put them back together and take them apart. But that was sort of off-limits, because it was very much of a humanities family.

My father was an historian; in fact, an expert on early Islam and an expert in Arabic language and Arabic culture. So I spent some of my youth in Beirut. He was also a spy; he was in the OSS. He died when I was very young. So he wasn’t much of an influence on my life, because I was five when he died.

My mother was an English teacher, and a very good writer and a very good editor at Ginn and Company, an editor of textbooks. She was a real stickler for getting things clear. So I think I learned my writing, to some degree, from her.

BINGHAM: So you hardly knew your father at all, then.

DENNETT: No.

BINGHAM: Did he just vanish?

DENNETT: Well, I know him through a thousand anecdotes and tales that his dear friends have regaled me with over the years, and apparently, I’m his spitting image, very much like him, but I’ll take their word for that.

BINGHAM: Have you spent much time in, did you ever go back to Beirut?

DENNETT: I spent some wonderful time in Beirut a long time ago, actually, at the height of Beirut’s glory, about ‘64 - 1964, when it was the Paris of the Middle East, I spent a month or so there with my family. It was great. That’s it. I haven’t been back since.

BINGHAM: How does one become a philosopher, then, in your case?

DENNETT: When I was a freshman, we read Descartes’ Meditations in intro to philosophy class, and I thought oh, man, this is really interesting. It’s wrong; I think I’ll figure out why it’s wrong, and it shouldn’t take me more than a couple of afternoons. I was hooked. Then that and Quine’s book, From a Logical Point of View, which I read in despair in the math library late at night that freshman year, because I was taking a very difficult course in logic. And the next morning I’d read the whole book and I decided to transfer to Harvard to work with him.

BINGHAM: This is Willard Van Orman Quine.

DENNETT: Willard Van Orman Quine, yes, the great American philosopher of language and metaphysics and logic and epistemology, yeah.

BINGHAM: What did you take from Quine, in a brief description?

DENNETT: I showed up at Harvard in the fall of 1960 as an eager sophomore, and Quine was offering a course on the philosophy of language. The main text was a book of his, just out, called Word and Object. Needless to say I signed up for the course, and it was a fantastic course. Quine was not a great teacher, but the material was wonderful.

BINGHAM: Okay, so when I say what did you take from him, what did you extract from your interchange and discussions with Quine?

DENNETT: Quine was a naturalist, and for him philosophy was continuous with science. It was just the sort of most abstract and most meta part of the scientific enterprise. It was science criticism, science enabling, trying to put the world together with science, and I just completely bought into that. I thought that was exactly right. And he tackled problems of meaning and language, and he recognized very clearly, notoriously, his thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation.

I think that’s a fundamental point. I think he was right about it, I think he never got a very clear defense of it, but I’ve defended it ever since then. It’s a concept which has to do with why it is that we can’t pin down with absolute precision and accuracy the meaning of anything. This doesn’t lead us to vapid relativism about meaning.

A simple analogy: if you’re a cryptographer and you have a bit of cipher text, a bit of code, and you find a decoding of it that makes sense, you’re morally certain that you’ve found the decoding. There’s not going to be another one, but it’s always logically possible. In fact, it’s trivially logically possible. You can invent some cockamamie code where it means anything you like. The fact that you’ve found an efficient decoding is, you can stop; you found it.

That’s the practical reality. If I want to know what you believe or what something you say means and I can find a coherent account that meets all the everyday constraints, I can be pretty sure that’s really what you mean and that’s really what your belief is. But there’s always a logical possibility that there’s some completely other interpretation of you, and we should simply tolerate that and say yeah, we don’t need any metaphysics to say no, no, there’s a really real, real secret meaning, even if it’s forever hidden from us.

No, the best interpretation you can get with all the constraints, that’s as close as you’ll ever get to objective meaning, and that’s good enough.

BINGHAM: Did you have conversation or exchange with Richard Rorty on this?

DENNETT: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah, Richard was a dear friend of mine, yeah.

BINGHAM: Because that would not be his position.

DENNETT: Well, I think it is. I mean, Dick was very fond of Quine’s view on many topics, and I think on this one in particular, at least I never occasioned a real battle with Dick on that, and he liked my position on these matters, as far as I can tell.

BINGHAM: You were at Harvard?

DENNETT: Yeah.

BINGHAM: And then?

DENNETT: Then went to Oxford.

BINGHAM: And what was happening at Oxford at the time?

DENNETT: Well, that was the - like the Milan Cathedral, the late, florid excrescence of gothic. This was the late, florid excrescence of ordinary language philosophy. It was sort of rotting on the vine, but there were thousands - not thousands, there were hundreds of Canadians and Americans and Australians who were all coming to Oxford to learn ordinary language philosophy, and most of it was pretty preposterous, but there were some bright moments.

I worked with Gilbert Ryle, and he was a great mentor. So that worked out fine, but it meant that I was either appalled or amused at a lot of what was going on in Oxford among my fellow graduate students.

BINGHAM: For somebody who doesn’t understand or who doesn’t know the history, what do you mean by what was going on at Oxford at the time? In terms of what was being discussed, and why was it preposterous?

DENNETT: Philosophy, I think, goes through these pendulum swings of overconfidence and complete lack of confidence, and this was a period of very low confidence, and philosophers were pretty well convincing themselves that all they could do is analyze the meanings of ordinary words and that this was enough; it was little puzzles.

There wasn’t any progress, there weren’t any theories. All you could do is sort of knit one, purl two, and study the meanings of particular words like believe or understand or imagine or pain or attend. And it was micro-trivia, done very cleverly, but to no real end.

BINGHAM: So you moved beyond that to?

DENNETT: Irrepressible American optimist that I was, I thought we could have theories, and I thought we could make some progress. I got very interested in the mind and the brain and so wrote a book called Content and Consciousness. That was my thesis, actually, at Oxford, and it was bizarre at the time, because there was enough speculative neuromodeling ideas in it, sort of protoconnectionist ideas, that they figured the examiners should include a neuroscientist.

So JZ Young, the great London neuroanatomist and AJ Ayer were my examiners, and that was considered a very strange combination, as indeed it was.

BINGHAM: It is indeed a strange combination.

DENNETT: Yes, yeah.

BINGHAM: In Andrew Brown’s piece about you in The Guardian, he mentions that when you got to Oxford, the impression was made on your landlord’s son at Oxford was as a sculptor? That John Graham, now a doctor, remembers the Dennetts turning up after their honeymoon with a block of marble a foot high and a set of cast-iron chisels with which Dan carved a man reading a book.

DENNETT: It’s true, yeah.

BINGHAM: How did sculpting get into your life?

DENNETT: Oh, I was going to be an artist at one point. When I was an undergraduate, it was either that or be a philosopher, and I think I made the right choice, but I still - well, I haven’t done any serious sculpture for years. I’ve done very small pieces, but you know, those are more whittles than sculptures.

BINGHAM: The point you made about these changing fashions in philosophy and so on, Peter Atkins was saying yesterday that he thought philosophy was essentially a waste of time, to put it kindly, and that nothing much emerged from it. What’s your take on that?

DENNETT: I think that that’s often been true. It’s true of a lot of philosophy now, but it’s true of a lot of fields. Sturgeon’s law is that 90% of everything is crap, and okay, so you look at the good stuff and don’t waste your time or anybody else’s on the bad stuff.

And I think there’s plenty of good stuff in philosophy, and I think that right now, I’m particularly high on the work that’s being done because I think we have a whole - actually now sort of two academic generations of philosophers who are knowledgeable about one science or another, or several. They have experience in the field, and in a way they are continuing the Quinean program that he was in effect too old to do.

But the idea of working side-by-side with the scientists and using the techniques and tools of the philosophers, such as they are, to break down some of the conceptual models and some of the just confusions that can arise anywhere. They can arise in any science just as they can arise in the law or in medicine or in history. And it’s really a question of figuring out what the right questions are to ask.

BINGHAM: We could talk, obviously, about your views on consciousness and so on and so forth, but let’s actually go to the subject of this conference.

DENNETT: Good, let’s do that.

BINGHAM: Where do you think we are at this point in discussing the subject matter of Breaking the Spell, Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. You’ve been on the road for a year, talking about these things. What’s your sense of it? Do you have an optimism about this? Where do you think we should go?

DENNETT: Actually, I am optimistic about this, not just because that’s my natural cast of mind anyway, but I see very heartening signs.

What I think has been happening in recent years, when we’ve seen this apparent upsurge of religious fervor, is more a matter of religious groups around the world confronting for the first time the democratization of information. Just the flood of information from cell phones and the Internet and television, and they’ve never had to deal with this. They could always isolate their children from this. They could always control what their children had contact with.

They can’t do that anymore. Short of tying them up and holding them in the house and turning off the electricity and taking away the batteries, they just can’t do it. And so they’re rather desperately trying everything in sight to see what they can do to preserve what they think they should preserve.

That in itself is perfectly rational if you love something dearly - you take whatever steps you can think of to try to protect it from something you see as a threat. And I think what we have to do is appreciate that that’s what’s happening, and then think what is the gentlest, kindest, firmest, least disruptive way of easing the pain of the democratization of information across the world?

And rather than thinking about exterminating religion or anything like this, we should think about it, if you like, in both evolutionary and you might say in epidemiological terms. We should encourage the evolution of avirulent forms of these religions, turning them into less toxic varieties; encouraging the growth of the less toxic varieties of every religion, and letting the really dangerous forms go extinct.

How do you do that? You do that by gently setting up competition between facts and myths, and you do that by education, and you don’t worry about the old folks. I think people are very rightly concerned that oh, poor Granny and Grandpa, you don’t want to disillusion them. You don’t want to say to them, you know, you’ve wasted your life on this. That’s cruel, that’s hard. Let them finish out their days with their illusions, as long as they’re not in charge of armies, or something like that.

Let’s just try to turn off the spigot and get their grandchildren and their children’s children and their children just to open their eyes to the wealth of factual information, not just about science but about religions, including their own religion. I think that the toxic forms of religion only survive when there’s enforced ignorance in the home. And if we can simply say you have no right to keep your children ignorant of these facts; these are just facts. These are not - this isn’t propaganda. These are truths. These are just as much truths as chemistry is truth and arithmetic is true.

If we get those truths to children first in this country and then around the world, then they can teach their children whatever else they want, and they’re going to find it’s going to be hard for them to teach their traditional doctrines. And so what will they do? They will revise; they will adjust. They will have to accommodate to convince their own children of these doctrines, and that’s a healthy direction.

I think - this is an empirical claim; I might be wrong - I think any religion that can thrive under conditions of open information deserves to thrive, and it’ll be just fine. And the rest should go extinct.

BINGHAM: Okay, now could you unpack this phrase you used, belief in belief? What do you mean by that?

DENNETT: Yeah. I guess it’s my favorite chapter in the book is about belief in belief. I began to notice that arguing against the existence of God is sort of pointless in most circumstances, because it’s not so much that people believe in God as they believe in belief in God. And in fact, more people believe in belief in God than believe in God.

How do I know that? Well, with very few exceptions, people who actually believe in God also believe in belief in God. That is they think it’s a good thing, they’re all for it, they’re proud of the fact that they believe in God, they think it’s good. Once in a while, you will encounter somebody who actually deeply, bitterly regrets the fact that they can’t shake their belief in God. They wish they could, but they’re just - it’s a weakness. That’s a rare individual.

So all those people believe in belief in God, and then the people who don’t believe in God, they believe, many of them, just believe in belief in God. So there’s more, all told. And the more I thought about it and the more I explored this, I discovered how true that is.

For instance, I would say, with few exceptions, the most hysterical and vitriolic criticisms of my book have been from people who themselves declare themselves not religious. They don’t need religion, but they are the self-appointed defenders of religion, and they believe in belief in God, and they view me as mounting an attack on this, and in a way, that I am. I’m saying the belief in belief in God is really what is standing in the way. It’s what’s doing all the work today.

And it’s not the only case of belief in belief. That is to say, scientists believe appropriately and passionately in the integrity of science. They want people to believe in science, and any time there’s a fraud in science, they’re torn. Do we not only stop the fraud but expose the miscreant to a huge blast of publicity? Or do we quietly and discreetly excise this culprit from our midst?

Well, there’s some powerful reasons for not wanting to parade our villains, because it might undermine the public trust in the integrity of science. On the other hand, it might improve the public trust in the integrity of science. Those strategic issues are issues about belief in belief. It’s just that in religion, they’re doing all the work.

BINGHAM: So what do we now know, in your view, about how beliefs are formed? The neuroscience of beliefs?

DENNETT: I don’t think we can tell a very good story yet about, to put it really crudely, the ratio of reason and emotion and reflex that contribute to the beliefs we have. We know, though, we don’t need neuroscience to tell us that we are equipped with superb fact-finding gear - eyes and ears. It’s actually pretty hard to deceive us on most mundane topics. We’re very good at catching out illusions and deceptions. We do have some weaknesses.

BINGHAM: Do you think that’s true?

DENNETT: We do have some weaknesses, and we have some systematic weaknesses, and it wouldn’t be so bad if there were not forces honed by an evolutionary process that are out to exploit those weaknesses, in the same way that predator-prey relationships are a case of mutual co-evolution, with one side trying to deceive the other, and the other side getting better and better at detecting that deception.

So in the realm of religions, what we’ve seen over thousands of years is a co-evolution between our capacity to detect the truth and ideas that are magnificently designed to sneak in behind our defenses, to exploit our emotional nature, and to in effect bamboozle us and get into our heads and then get propagated along to other people. So we really do get an insight into what’s going on if we think about these ideas as symbiants that invade brains when they can. And the ones that really stick, the ones that are infectious, as we say, that are unforgettable - to say that an idea is unforgettable is to say not that it, as it were, is made out of steel or something, it’s that it contrives for its own replication within the brain.

You rehearse it and rehearse it and rehearse it and it’s in there and it can become a little obsession, and you’ve got it in there, you’re not going to get rid of it, and you want to pass it on to your neighbors. And some ideas are just much better designed to do that than others.

Advertisers consciously try to design ideas, slogans, sound bites, that will be, as the Germans say, an earworm that will get into our head like an advertising jingle and just not leave. The ideas that do this that we find populating religions around the world were not in the main consciously designed by individual idea designers; they didn’t have to be. They evolved the same way words evolved - by a process of cultural natural selection.

After all, there have been probably hundreds of thousands of religions. Religions get started every day, still. Most of those are extinct, same as with species. The religions that we see that have survived, transforming themselves all the way for several millennia, these are the winners of a huge cultural evolution tournament. These are the finely honed, beautifully tuned brain inhabitors that we now have, for better or for worse.

That doesn’t say they’re bad. After all, science is another such set of ideas, and we work at coming up with interesting mnemonics and wonderful graphic ways of making clear the second law of thermodynamics and other things that are important. So we do actively work on trying to make these unforgettable ideas.

BINGHAM: One of the criticisms obviously is that people have trouble accepting that science is a privileged form of knowledge; that the truths of science are the best. How do you deal with that kind of thing?

DENNETT: First of all, I find it a little hard to take seriously. These are people who don’t fear taking airplane flights and are very angry if it turns out that something they’ve been ingesting has a dangerous property in it that science has pointed out, and somehow they’ve nevertheless been purveyed this by some evil, science-ignoring company. People don’t ignore science. It’s not for nothing that two of the most successful religions that have been concocted in the last few centuries are Christian Science and Scientology.

Everybody understands the authority of science, and in fact post-modernist critics, who like to talk about science as one conversation among many, how do they support their claim? By looking at the frailties of science that have been pointed out by science. Always. Science is the source of science criticism. It is the self-critical enterprise. That’s completely unlike religion.

BINGHAM: So who do you think have been the most important formative influences on your thinking?

DENNETT: Darwin, of course. Quine and Ryle and Hume and Alan Turing. Those are my heroes.

BINGHAM: Who would you have liked to have had a conversation with? Anybody in history if you had a chance?

DENNETT: I think David Hume would have been great company, and Alan Turing. If I could bring Alan Turing back to today in a time machine and set him loose with the world that in effect he’s created, I would just love to see him. I think it would take him about two minutes to understand everything that’s happened.

BINGHAM: What would you say to him, do you think?

DENNETT: I don’t think I’d have to say anything to him. I think I’d just show him my laptop and see how long it took him to imagine the waves of brilliant engineering that fell right out of things that he’d figured out, you know, back in the forties.

BINGHAM: I remember when we were doing a television series together many, many years ago, actually, went with Paul Churchland, there was a Turing test going on, do you remember that?

DENNETT: Oh, that’s right, yes. I think I was even presiding over it.

BINGHAM: Yes, exactly. Does that still make any sense?

DENNETT: Well, it didn’t make sense then except as sort of an interesting dress rehearsal for something that someday might make sense. When Turing put forward the Turing test, he didn’t mean it to be a platform for serious scientific research. He meant it as a conversation-stopper, as a thought experiment that should convince people that, come on, folks, any computer that could pass this test fair and square, of course it would be intelligent.

But of course, philosophers being what they are, they refused to accept this I think entirely sane line of reasoning on Turing’s side.

BINGHAM: The idea being that when one sits behind a screen and you get input from the other side, you couldn’t see what was on the other side.

DENNETT: After all, how do I know you’re intelligent? You passed the Turing test. It’s what we’re doing right now; we’re having a conversation. And this idea goes back to Descartes. There’s this lovely passage, often quoted from the Discourse on Method where Descartes says, back in the 17th century, how could you tell that something was an automaton and not a human being?

And he said well, have a conversation with it. If it can carry on intelligently on no matter what subject, then it can’t be a machine. What he was wrong about - it’s a great test. He just couldn’t take seriously a mechanism as complex as what we’ve got between our ears. I mean, I like to imagine Descartes - he doesn’t say why a machine couldn’t do it. He does, a little bit.

He says oh, it could do two or three or seven - it could do a few things. You push it here and it says one thing, you push it there, it says another thing. Well, that’s sort of the limits of clockwork in his day. He never imagined a clock with a hundred million springs and 50 billion pulleys and wires and cog wheels. He would have thought, well, that’s just silly. He had no way of taking a machine that size, seriously.

We now know that brains are machines of that size. They have, in effect, trillions of moving parts. So who knows what you can do with a machine with a trillion moving parts?

BINGHAM: I do remember, though, that my experience of the Turing test was that of the three, I actually interpreted the input from two of the humans as being from a computer, so I-

DENNETT: This is actually a lovely illustration of sort of what’s wrong with philosophers’ thought experiments sometimes, and that is philosophers’ thought experiments are always done, the sun’s always shining and it never rains and the electricity always works, and very few surprises in thought experiments. When you actually do a real experiment, you discover all sorts of boundary conditions you’d never thought of, and you begin to realize they’re important.

And what happened in that Turing test was really quite amusing. That was the third annual Loebner Prize test, and the first two years we had discovered that the judges were bizarrely passive. They didn’t probe in any aggressive way the contestants, which Turing supposed would actually happen. So in the third year, as you will no doubt remember, I was actually the author of this little bit of briefing.

I said, think of yourself as a counter-spy, and your job is to catch the imposter. You’re supposed to use ordinary conversational gambits, but you’re task is not to let any computers through this screening process, and you should be ashamed if you let any through. So this was simply to gear people up to be more diligent.

And so what happened was, if you looked at the contestants, the human - I think there were three human beings behind the screen and seven computer programs - there was a huge difference. The computer programs just weren’t any good at all. And then there were these three human beings, and the gulf between them and the computers was so great that a number of you judges reasoned as follows - Turing hadn’t counted on this.

We wouldn’t be having this competition if there wasn’t at least one program which was really pretty good. So, I’ll just take the least impressive human being, and I’ll declare that a computer so that I protect myself against being the dupe here. And so a bunch of the judges did that. And that’s how some human beings got declared to be computers.

BINGHAM: That’s pretty much what happened, as I recall, yeah. Do you still find this useful, this whole notion of the Cartesian theater? You still talk about it, still people ask about it.

DENNETT: Well yeah, I still find it useful to warn people about the mistake of the Cartesian theater. It’s really a very seductive idea. The light comes in our eyes, the sound waves come in our ears, we touch things, all these nerve signals start heading up, heading up, heading up and there’s processing, processing, processing. But of course that’s all in the medium of spike trains and neurons.

And then what happens? Well, they get analyzed and analyzed and analyzed, and then what happens? Well, and then consciousness happens. Where? Well, somewhere right in the middle there has got to be a sort of summit to this mountain where the input finally arrives at the place where the input’s supposed to go. That’s the Cartesian theater. That’s a mistake.

The idea that there is a privileged place in the brain where everything comes together for consciousness is a tremendously appealing idea, but it can be resisted, and it should. Now when people ask me about this, they said wait a minute, is this an empirical point or is this a conceptual point? Well, it’s both.

First there’s the empirical point, and that is when we look inside, we find there isn’t any such place. But we might have looked inside and found that there was such a place. Easy enough to imagine. In fact, there’s a famous film clip which is a beautiful example of this, and that’s in “Men in Black”. It’s in the morgue when they slide out the corpse and Will Smith touches the little point on the guy’s ear and his face opens up, and there’s a little guy sitting in the control room, and he’s looking at the screens and pushing the buttons. That’s the Cartesian theater. It’s perfectly coherent. We might have found that if we looked inside, but, you know, we didn’t. So that’s the empirical point. That’s not what we found.

The conceptual point is if we had found that, then of course we would have to look in the little green man’s head, and at some point we’ve got to realize it’s not Cartesian theaters all the way down. So at some point, you have to take all the work that you’re imagining the little guy in there to do, and you’ve got to distribute it around in space and time in the brain and recognize that that’s what consciousness is. It’s that work getting done, and once it’s done it doesn’t have to be done again in this little, privileged theater.

And so consciousness is smeared spatially and temporally. Because it’s smeared spatially, it has to be smeared temporally, otherwise we’d have some kind of magic, which we don’t need. And there’s a notional sense of simultaneity, which is more important than the actual timing of events in the brain.

BINGHAM: Do you think it’s a prerequisite of getting across any of these ideas about religion that there be more general acceptance and understanding of how minds work or how brains work that it’s the neuroscience teaching?

DENNETT: Yeah, I think so. Some years ago, there was a lovely philosopher of science and journalist in Italy named Giulio Giorello, and he did an interview with me. And I don’t know if he wrote it or not, but the headline in Corriere della Sera when it was published was Sì, abbiamo un'anima. Ma è fatta di tanti piccoli robot – “Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots.”

And I thought, exactly. That’s the view. Yes, we have a soul, but in what sense? In the sense that our brains, unlike the brains even of dogs and cats and chimpanzees and dolphins, our brains have functional structures that give our brains powers that no other brains have - powers of look-ahead, primarily. We can understand our position in the world, we can see the future, we can understand where we came from. We know what we’re here. No buffalo knows it’s a buffalo, but we jolly well know that we’re members of Homo sapiens, and it’s the knowledge that we have and the can-do, our capacity to think ahead and to reflect and to evaluate and to evaluate our evaluations, and evaluate the grounds for our evaluations.

It’s this expandable capacity to represent reasons that we have that gives us a soul. But what’s it made of? It’s made of neurons. It’s made of lots of tiny robots. And we can actually explain the structure and operation of that kind of soul, whereas an eternal, immortal, immaterial soul is just a metaphysical rug under which you sweep your embarrassment for not having any explanation.

BINGHAM: So when you use the phrase eyeglasses for the soul, are you talking about an fMRI?

DENNETT: I used the phrase eyeglasses for the soul yesterday as a metaphor for what I take what one of my heroes, Hume, meant when he said, morality starts with the natural sentiments. This is love and compassion and hatred of pain and care for your immediate family first. We have certain built-in, hardwired, provided in your genes dispositions and powers and propensities, and that’s got to be the foundation on which morality is built.

But then, Hume says, we have the artificial virtues, which are the creations of a social process, and that we convince each other are important and we instill in the young, and this is moral education. And the result is that infirmities, weaknesses, susceptibilities to illusion that we discover in our reflectiveness in the minds that we’re given by our genes we can correct to some degree, we can harness and adjust.

So in the same way that if we discover we’re myopic we can wear glasses. We’re not genetically doomed to myopia; we can simply correct that condition. And we’re not genetically doomed by our disgust reactions, our instincts for love, our instincts for hate and fear. We’ve got them, we should understand them, and then we should figure out what kind of technology in the broadest sense, including ideas, theories, precepts, not just hardware, what kind of technology can we devise that we can introduce into our brains to achieve the kind of souls that we want?

Well now is this just relativism? No, because we, and who else? All of us, all the people, can, in principle, form a community to discuss these things. In the same way the scientific community does. It’s not science, it’s politics, but it has its own rules of procedure in the same way science does. We say to everybody around the world, come join us, be part of the conversation.

You have to leave certain things behind. You can bring in your holy books, your holy scriptures, but you can’t use them as trump cards. There may be great wisdom in your holy texts, but just saying that this is what your text says cuts no particular ice. You’ve got to convince the rest of us that what your text says is something that we should believe, not just because you believe it.

In other words, if somebody says well, look, this is non-negotiable. I’m a Hindu, and Hindus believe this and that’s it, we have to say to that person no, no, you don’t get to play that card. If you really can’t discuss this point, then you’ve declared yourself disabled in this conversation. Part of what makes you capable of participating in this discussion is that you can put everything, everything on the table and take on the responsibility for defending this as a moral claim.

People want to play the faith card, and you say no, you can play the faith card somewhere else, but not in this conversation. If you think that some practice in your culture is not just good for you but good for everybody, try to explain it to us. Maybe you’ll convince us. Meanwhile, we’re trying to do the same to them. And is there any guarantee that this will achieve a convergence?

No, but there’s a pretty good reason to believe that a lot of this is already convergent. There’s a huge amount of shared moral conviction that we can start with. That’s our platform, that’s our leverage. And if we’re as openminded with their creeds and worries and fears, if we’re open-minded with them, and if we can encourage them to be open-minded with us, then we can work out a shared ethic.

Not hammered out in every last detail, but this is like Sam Harris’s lovely analogy with food. Lots of different kinds of food. We can appreciate I don’t want that food, but I understand why you like it and it’s okay, because it’s not poisonous. At least it’s not poisonous for you folks, so you can have it.

And this process, it’s not a scientific process, it’s a political process. But just like a scientific process, there’s good process and bad process. If the process is transparent, if it doesn’t involve bullying, if everything is up for discussion, if people treat each other with respect, if it’s everywhere answerable to the scientifically determined facts, this is how you derive ought from is. And you say well, it’s not absolute, absolute ought.

No, of course not. But in the limit, it’s the consensus of what the people alive today think we ought to do. And if we look at the history of religions, we see that religions have adjusted, adjusted, adjusted, adjusted over the centuries. The ethical precepts of religions, they are very different from what they were 2,000 years ago. Religions have adjusted before, and they’ll adjust again.

In fact religions have changed more in the last hundred years than they changed in the last thousand years, and maybe they’ll change in the next ten years as much as they changed in the last hundred years. I’m actually very optimistic about that.

BINGHAM: So if you accept as a basic premise that enlarging the constituency of reason was a good goal, how would you define now, operationally, reason?

DENNETT: Why would that be a useful exercise, to operationally define reason? I think it’s analogous to a problem that arises more narrowly within logic. There’s debates among logicians about what counts as, as it were, the best logic, the right logic. Are we going to have classical logic, are we going to have one non-classical logic, another one going to be intuitionists, are we going to have some other? And you ask yourself, is this a well-joined issue?

And I think in some sense yeah, it is. But notice that the ideal that they are arguing about, they can’t articulate yet. It’s the ideal of if you like perfect rationality, and there’s the pros and cons that they variously have, but they have a shared but not definable ideal of what a logic should do. And I think reason is just cognitive excellence, and what that comes to, we’re still finding out. And in the same way, we can find out what moral excellence is.

BINGHAM: Let’s take two very short, quick questions at the end. Who’s the smartest person you know, and who’s the wisest, and what’s the difference?

DENNETT: Oh, my. Well, one of the smartest people that I’ve ever known died just recently, and that’s John Maynard Smith. And he also strikes me as one of the wisest. He was both breathtakingly clever and incisive, but also a very sweet and gentle man who was wonderful at explaining things and never bullied anybody. So that’s the first name that comes to mind. I’m just going to stick with that.

BINGHAM: Okay, that’s a good one. If you had a chance of doing anything other than what you’re doing now, what would you have been?

DENNETT: I think I’ve already answered that. I think I probably would have been an engineer. Probably not a very good one.

BINGHAM: Well you’re still sort of working, and you’ve almost sort of answered this one as well, but what are you optimistic about with the progress question?

DENNETT: I am optimistic about the future of reason. I think that - and my email bears this out - there’s a tremendous discomfort with the irrationality that we see in the world today, and although some people have I think hugely overreacted to religion and the sort of threat of religion in the same way our government has overreacted to the threat of terrorism.

And it’s not that big a problem, and if we just calmly, firmly proceed with better education and more transparency and more openness, I think we’re going to be amazed at the results.

AUSTIN DACEY: To help respond to Roger’s question about what is reason, by way of answering a related question, what is a reason, or what is it to give a reason, and I wanted to suggest that there’s a great answer to that in that cornucopia of ideas that you call a book, Freedom Evolves, your great book on the free will problem, where you have a kind of evolutionary account of reasons according to which a reason is something that you give to someone else so as to take responsibility for your actions.

It’s what marks the difference between something that just happened and something that you did. So if we’re riding in the subway together and I shove you by accident or I shove you because you’re standing on my foot, it’s my giving you the reason, you were standing on my food, that marks a difference between the accident and the action.

And this seems to be something that is part of our evolved, universal psychology, and might be something that could form part of a shared moral vocabulary in this discussion that you sketched.

DENNETT: In fact, let me just expand a little bit more on that. Thanks very much for the compliment, and for drawing up that point. I think a big mistake we’re apt to make about reasons is that we confuse represented reasons with reasons. I think there’ve been reasons for as long as there’s been life. There’s reasons why the primordial cells are designed the way they are, and there’s reasons why they do the things they do - for instance, following gradients through the primordial soup.

Now they don’t appreciate the reasons; the reasons aren’t represented anywhere. We, in retrospect, however, can see what the reasons were. That was the birth of reasons. And the biosphere is just chock-a-block with reasons. We’re the first reason representers. For instance, one of my favorite examples is the baby cuckoo chick, when it hatches, the first thing it does is it tries to push the other eggs, the eggs of its hosts out of the nest so it can monopolize the resources.

Now that’s the reason it’s doing it. It doesn’t know the reason, the little bird brain; it’s innocent as can be. It doesn’t know the reason, but that is the reason, and it’s what I call a free-floating rationale.

BINGHAM: The classic example of the wasp.

DENNETT: But when chimpanzees do things for reasons, those are reasons just the way it’s reasons for cuckoo chicks. But the chimpanzees don’t represent their reasons to themselves the way we do either. They are more advanced than the cuckoo, and they can sort of represent their reasons, but they can’t share their reasons. They can’t reason together. It’s the fact that we can have a conversation, that we can represent reasons and then criticize our reasons, that’s something that we have that no other species has, and that is, in fact, I think, the source of our morality.

BINGHAM: So you think that if I said in sign language to Kanzi come, let us reason together, it wouldn’t have much going?

DENNETT: I think that’s like talking to God. You can always say that to Kanzi, but Kanzi’s not going to answer you.

BINGHAM: Rama? You had a question.

V.S. RAMACHANDRAN: I just had a comment about your belief in belief, which I think is a very interesting point, and I’m reminded of this from a completely different area of research - that is, placebos. And what’s interesting about placebos, everybody here, I’m sure, knows what a placebo is. You have a real pill and you have a pink pill and you don’t do anything at all, and the pink pill works better than not doing anything at all.

Now the amazing thing is there was a study not long ago showing placebos work even if you tell the person it is a placebo. There is a pink pill which doesn’t do anything. And I think something like a prayer might be like that. I know people who are perfectly rational who will say, “I know prayers are placebos, but it works anyway, so I’m going to pray.” So this may be the origins of many religious beliefs in that gray zone where people believe in belief, but they don’t actually believe.

DENNETT: Yeah. I have a bit about placebos in Breaking the Spell, and I think that in fact it’s very interesting to look at placebos and at shamanic rituals and recognize that here is a case, too, where the shamans, the witch doctors, 10,000 years ago when there was no real medicine, if you had a problem, the only health insurance you had was a witch doctor. And the witch doctor could actually help you about some things, because they’d sort of discovered the placebo effect, and they had all sorts of very elegant ways of ritualizing this to enhance the effect.

They also had some stuff that really worked. They had herbs and so forth that really had potent properties. That’s why the drug companies are scavenging the world’s shamanic rituals to try to find out what they’ve got there that works.

But now the idea is that those rituals that were beautifully honed by cultural evolution over thousands of years didn’t work on everybody. Some people are just more or less immune to rituals. Those people had no health insurance. That would be a very strong truncation selection pressure, so that in those human lineages where there was a strong shamanic tradition, we would predict that people would have brains that made them more susceptible to the rituals that enhanced placebo effects than not, in the same way that you get a co-evolution between the cultural practice of dairy herding and lactose tolerance in adulthood, so you would have a co-evolution between the culturally evolved practices of shamans and the genetic response to that, a heightened susceptibility to ritual. That’s a hypothesis that can be empirically explored, and I think it may turn out to be close to the truth.

BINGHAM: Actually, I was just looking at this. There’s a little card that Jerry Orstrom gave me yesterday, this is on the other side of A Brief History of Gravity. This is a 5,000-year history of alternative medicine. 3,000 B.C. – eat this root. 100 A.D. – that is a heathen root, don’t eat it; say this prayer. 1300 A.D. – that prayer’s superstition, don’t say it; drink this snake oil. That was 1800 A.D., sorry. 1900 A.D. – that snake oil is phony, don’t drink it; take this pill. 2006 A.D. – that pill is artificial, don’t take it; eat this root.

Phillip? Just a couple more questions, then we will go to lunch.

PHILIP LOW: I very much enjoyed this conversation. There’s just one thing you said which caused me some pause; your comment about the buffalos. I mean, which particular brain structure or oscillations do buffalos lack and are found in humans, which enable us to say that we are Homo sapiens and buffalos not to know that they are buffalos? You’ve said that birds have very innocent brains. Well, I’ve spent a few years looking at those brains, and even in those innocent brains you find structures which are actually dedicated to the bird’s own song, not unspecific. So why would you say such a thing?

DENNETT: Oh, let me clarify. Buffalos, like any sexually reproducing species, know their own kind. Not perfectly; that’s why orchids can get pollinated by insects that think they’re mating with their own kind. So there’s recognition, of course, of course. And so there has to be something in the brain of every species that permits it to do something like template matching. Whether it’s done olfactorily or by visual cues or whatever, of course that’s true. So buffalos, in one sense, know what buffalos are. They’re the things that they will mate with, to a first approximation. But that’s all they know. We know rather more. We know, for instance, that we are vertebrates, and that we are mammals, and that we know how we are positioned with respect to the other species in the biosphere, and no other species knows that.

BINGHAM: Okay.

TERRY SEJNOWSKI: Yeah, first a comment on that last point, and then a question. I think that as we learn more about the brain, we’re going to be amazed at our narrow-mindedness about what other animals think about. I really think that as a species, we’re incredibly narrow in terms of what we attribute to other fellow creatures on this Earth. Dolphins, gray parrots. Okay, so that’s just a comment, and it’s a belief, and I think that we’ll be very, very surprised as we learn more about these other brains.

But here’s a question for you. There’s been a small revolution occurring in areas of psychology and neuroscience, suggesting that large parts of the brain, which are important for doing all the heavy lifting, all the processing, all the visual reception and making decisions are unconscious and unavailable to consciousness. What role for the unconscious is there in your plan for basing everything on pure reason?

DENNETT: Yeah, good. First let me comment on your hunch about animal minds. Of course that’s just a hunch, as you say; you may be right. I have thought that it was more important to dampen the enthusiasm for what I’ve called the Beatrix Potter syndrome, which is to think that every animal is just sort of a human being in a fur coat, and that they pretty much think the way we do, and there’s a tremendous seduction to imagining the inner lives of animals as very much like ours, just plus the fur and the echolocation.

TERRY SEJNOWSKI: That’s anthropomorphism, and that’s wrong.

DENNETT: That’s anthropomorphism - not realizing how alien those minds are. And so I have wanted to stress the differences, not just in how alien they are, how unlike our minds a lot of those minds are, in addition to the ways, of course, that they’re like ours, but also to stress what I think is just obvious, and that is we’re the species with civilization and science and the mind tools, the thinking tools, that this has made available just skyrockets any normal human being into a whole new world that no animal has access to.

Richard Gregory says that a thinking tool, it doesn’t just take intelligence to use a pencil or tools in general, but they enhance your intelligence. They make it possible for you to do things with your brain that other animals can’t do. My friend Bo Dahlbom has a nice line that I quote somewhere; he says, “You can’t do much carpentry with your bare hands, and you can’t do much thinking with a bare brain.”

And no human being thinks with a bare brain. We fill our heads with techniques and facts and prosthetic devices and so forth. And if it weren’t for that, we wouldn’t be the moral species. That’s what gives us noblesse oblige. We’ve got the power, that’s why we’ve got the obligations. That’s why no other animal is morally obligated the way we can be morally obligated.

Let’s see, you had another point there, as well.

TERRY SEJNOWSKI: Your unconscious mind.

DENNETT: Oh, yeah. That’s a very interesting issue. We are learning that the pathways between the outside world and that part of our internal forum that we can talk about - I’m being very careful not to put the Cartesian theater back in there - are not as, as it were, sacrosanct and as clean and as crisp. The processing that goes on doesn’t have quite the integrity that we could imagine it to have. But we learn that. Now it’s time to make the prosthetic devices that respond to that discovery.

We need eyeglasses for the soul there, too, and as we learn that we are suckers for the gambler’s fallacy - a nice example, I can’t remember the name of this particular fallacy, you show one picture of a starving child and you’ll get more money than if you show two pictures of starving children.

What we’ve got here is an arms race in the evolutionary sense, where as we discover these chinks in our armor, these weaknesses, these flaws, these fallings-short of optimality, we do two things: some people think of clever ways of exploiting them, and other people think of clever ways of blocking that exploitation. It’s a moving target, and it’s always going to be one.

BINGHAM: Pat, do you want to talk about the rest of the moral menagerie?

PATRICIA CHURCHLAND: Yeah, yeah, a little bit. Of course anthropomorphism can get silly; we know all about that. But one of the things that I think is very interesting about animal behavior studies is the discovery of the complexity that non-verbal animals are entirely capable of enjoying representationally.

So for example, corvids turn out to be able to solve extremely complex problems in one go, and they don’t talk to themselves and they don’t have reasons and so forth - or at least they don’t have verbal reasons. And it turns out that jays have a rather complex theory of mind, in the sense that they know who all the individuals are and can identify them, they know who in the hierarchy can see where they are caching nuts and so forth.

And so it turns out that what you call the mere hunch of Terry’s is actually not so much a mere hunch but an hypothesis for which there is accumulating evidence. And this is against the backdrop of something else, which I think is really important and quite staggering, and that is the discovery by molecular biology that humans have only about 28,000 genes and we share all but about 300 with mice.

Now, related to that is the discovery that our brains structurally are very, very similar, and the lesson about evolution that evolutionary psychologists need to know is that evolution has been extraordinarily conservative in the way it builds nervous systems and that your nervous system and that of a mouse and that even invertebrates is extremely similar.

And this really does, I think, provoke the thought that, of course language makes a difference in the case of humans, but it may be that it’s a very small difference in terms of the actual brain. I mean Marty Sereno has this wonderful hypothesis that it’s that sheer number of neurons is what makes the difference.

And finally, of course, to get back to animal studies, it turns out that if you look carefully and you look closely, that animals also have something which you might call a representation of what’s a fair division and what’s not a fair division. Perhaps they don’t share exactly what you mean by a system of justice or human rights or what have you, but relative to their way of making a living and their particular niche, they have a kind of moral organization that serves them extremely well.

And to say, I think, that we alone are the moral organisms is a kind of inverse Beatrix Potter problem, and that is that you’re failing to recognize the complexity of social organization in non-human animals.

DENNETT: Okay. First of all, I know that literature pretty well; I taught a course with Robert Cook, who’s one of the experts on bird intelligence, on animal intelligence. And I wrote an article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences some years ago about this very issue, intentional systems and cognitive ethology. And what I said there is that we get this dynamic, this pendulum swing between the romantics and the killjoys, and it’s still going on 20 years later.

We have people saying oh, look how fantastically wonderful animals are. Those are the romantics. And then somebody does an experiment and says oh my god, look how stupid they are. That’s still going on. And yeah, the corvids are great, but if you want to do experiments to show that things that oh my god, you mean corvids can do this but they can’t do that? I would never have imagined they couldn’t do that.

Everywhere you look, you find these weird truncations of their competence. I mean, that’s what Seyfarth and Cheney showed with the vervet monkeys. They’re brilliant in these some areas, and dense as a post right next door.

CHURCHLAND: Just like humans.

DENNETT: Yeah - no, no.

[Laughter]

DENNETT: No, no; not like humans. The truncations are alien; they’re very weird. It’s very hard for us. We’ve said today, I don’t know how Frances Collins can be a good scientist and how he can hold these other views. That’s a sort of a bizarre division of a mind. But I think that first of all, yes, we have to proceed without any blanket claims about what kind of sort of proto-morality animals have, and just how much they represent their social surroundings, and it’s very interesting work, and it’s hard to study, and there’s the positive side and there’s the negative side.

You’ve stressed the positive, and today I will stress the negative, and there’s a lot more that has to be learned there. But as far as the point about the conservativeness of the genes and the similarity of the brains, I guess I don’t think there’s a big point there, for this reason. I’ve got a laptop right over there, and that architecture is basically the same as on the first computer that Turing ever built. And it can do a kazillion things that that computer that he built couldn’t do - software.

Software. And that’s the whole point of the hardware-software distinction. There’s so many things we can do with our brains that chimpanzees can’t do with their brains because they can’t download the software.

Now it might be, to pursue your point about conservativeness - and I’ve worried about this. It could be that you can make one or two or three tiny changes in a chimpanzee genome and whoop, they got a human brain, just like that, that could learn a language, that could go to school, and so forth. That is a distinct possibility. But until that happens, we now know from what, half a century of very clever and diligent efforts to teach chimpanzees language, not going to happen unless we make those changes in the brain.

BINGHAM: We’re sort of running out of time here. Do you have just one question there?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. So you talked about facts and myth; religion versus science, but I think there’s another front where there’s a distrust from science. I would say it’s scientific as well, but it’s facts versus facts, and the second set of facts are facts about science. So to take two examples, looking at the history of science, people would probably say they’re concerned about, say, ableism in science, or the situation with ecology.

Specifically, for example, if we think of mainstream science or let’s say even big science as driving technology, what’s happening in the rainforest I think could be very well argued to be connected to science in some way. Abelism, for example, you’ve mentioned Turing. Turing, in a sense, died because the science of the day, or at least the mainstream science, thought that there was a problem with homosexuality and tried to fix him, and it was tragic - tragic consequences.

So my question is how do we spot that today in science, first of all. How do we deal with the problem of skepticism, which I think is probably a real problem, and secondly, what do you think are the big mistakes that we’re making today? Because if it happened in the past, clearly it’s probably happening now. What are the things we really should watch out for?

DENNETT: Well of course the way science deals with its own flaws is to be self-critical and to catch them and to try to fix them. But this doesn’t come for free, it takes time and energy and, quite bluntly, money to do that, too. And one of the problems we have is that science is getting very, very expensive, and the money has a very distorting effect, as we all know.

But even there, I think we can get a sort of compensatory development of the very scientific practice. My favorite prediction along those lines is that many of the most important and exciting discoveries in psychology in the next 20 years are going to come out of not universities but liberal arts colleges. Here’s why.

They have psych departments, they can’t afford fMRI machines. Their faculty are going to do all the clever experiments that you don’t need fancy scanning to do, and they’re undergraduates and they are going to write the articles that are going to discover lots of effects that it would be too expensive and difficult for the researchers at the major universities to go, because if there isn’t a scanning component in their research, they can’t get a grant to do it. And this is going to be done grantlessly, by and large, and that’s a self-correcting mechanism. I think things like that will happen.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But at the same time, the DSM, for example, is proliferating, right? So again, if we’re looking at the errors, if we have to look at what is symmetrical today, yes, we’re gaining knowledge about cognition, but we’re also promoting all these infirmities, as you mentioned, that I think probably analogously seemed very similar to what was done back then.

DENNETT: I’m sure there’s many uncorrected and unheralded problems and sort of pathologies in science, and I don’t have any blanket cure for that but just more diligence and more reflectiveness.

BINGHAM: What’s the biggest mistake you ever made, and what did you learn from it?

DENNETT: Oh, the biggest mistake I ever made I would never say out loud, I guess. That would be my biggest mistake, right there.

BINGHAM: Dan Dennett, thank you very much.

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Crash Course: Chapter 20

WHAT SHOULD I DO?

FOLLOW THIS LINK!
This chapter is the final integration of all the prior chapters and attempts to provide clarity around the question of, “What should I do?” Let me rephrase that. What should WE do? Because the changes that are potentially coming are not solvable alone.

Chapter 20 is not going to be a simple list of things to do. Instead, it will reflect my goal of each person assuming responsibility for their own actions.

Chapter 20 is going to provide a framework for action. This is a way of structuring all the myriad things you COULD do, into the prioritized list of things you WILL do. Consider it your personal risk-mitigation plan.

I’m already drawing up plans for a new follow-on series of videos that will lay out my proposed solutions for the nation and globe in more detail.

Okay, so you’ve seen the entire Crash Course, showing how the Economy, Energy, and the Environment are interlinked. Specifically, you’ve seen that there is a substantial mismatch between an economic model that must grow and a physical world of peaking oil and depleting resources. We cannot possibly solve any one of these main issues in isolation, because doing so will simply create new problems in one of the other “E”s. Truly non-status-quo solutions are called for.

Which means there is a very real chance that our collective path will not be a linear extrapolation of the present. Our individual challenge is to accept the possibility that the future may be quite a departure from the present.

I believe that the future is not some purely random roll of the dice, and that we can minimize future disruptions in our lives by taking actions today.

In one way I am glad to have waited to produce this final chapter, because we have had the great financial panic of the Fall of 2008, and we can more precisely map where this is all headed.

The multi-trillion-dollar bailout packages offered to banks by various governments across the globe are nearly 100% dedicated towards preserving the status quo.

But at the same time, none of these challenges or trends are going to be helped in the slightest by bailing out the banking system, and some will be made worse. The fact that our national leaders have chosen to go several trillion dollars further into debt in a desperate bid to preserve "what was" simply indicates that it is now even more probable that the burden of meeting these challenges has shifted a bit further towards private citizens and small communities.

Part of the complication with developing a “what should we do” chapter is that I have no idea where your beliefs lie. Everybody exists somewhere along this spectrum of belief, ranging from expecting a rather ordinary, if not slight, interruption in economic growth, all the way on up to a big breakdown. Everybody exists along here somewhere.

And depending on where you happen to sit, both the number of things you could do, and their urgency, increase dramatically.

Given this, where do we start? How do we get started, when there are so many variables and things that need doing?

This is why we need a framework for action.

There are four sequential steps to this framework. First, you have to decide that you are going to take action. Without this commitment, there’s not much point in continuing. Second, you need to take stock of where you are, and here I propose a self-assessment that will unearth your strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats. Third, you’ve got to sort among the infinite list of things you could do, and then fourth, you’ve got to prioritize this list, because you can’t do everything. Together, these create the framework for action.

So let’s begin with Step 1 - the case for action.

First, let’s add some detail to the spectrum I laid out before. Here we might assess the potential for disruption as beginning with “status quo,” meaning that all the key risks dissipate relatively rapidly. Next on the spectrum would be a prolonged recession and all that that entails. Next we might place a collapse of the financial system on here, and finally we might envisage a collapse of government services at all levels

I am pretty certain that our future lies somewhere along this spectrum; the problem is, I don’t know where. The key here is that I cannot entirely rule out any particular outcome. I can’t place a probability of zero next to any of these, so I need to weigh them all.

So let’s play a little thought game with one of them and see how it might lead to making a case for action. Let’s use #3 – Financial System Collapse.

Without worrying about how likely or probable a financial crisis might be, let’s simply say it is either true or it is false. That is, it either happens or it doesn’t. Hopefully we can all agree that “true or false” pretty much covers the total range of possible outcomes.

And down on this axis, we’ll say that you either prepared for this crisis in advance or you did not. Again, it is either true or false that you chose to take steps to mitigate the impact of a financial crisis.

So what happens if it’s both true that the crisis happened and that you did prepare as best you could? Congratulations - give yourself a smiley face; you did the best you could.

And what about the case where the crisis did not happen and you did not prepare? Again, congratulations - you did the best you could. It turns out that these are essentially equivalent outcomes, and we can therefore remove them from our decision framework. In each case, we got the best outcome we could, so there’s not much to be gained from weighing and comparing them.

But what about this case, where the crisis did not happen but you did prepare? How bad could that be? What’s the worst that you could put in this box? Well, you probably wasted some money (maybe the opportunity to participate in capital gains in the stock market) and some wasted time, but perhaps worst of all, you ended up feeling foolish. That’s awful.

Now let’s compare this box to this other box, where the financial crisis happened but you did not prepare. What can we put in this box? Here it’s possible that you suffered a massive loss of wealth, had to make sudden, massive adjustments under the pressure of little time and scarce resources, and live with a sense of recrimination for having been “right” in your concerns but unprepared nonetheless. You can probably put a bunch more things in each of these boxes, and you should. But for our purposes, we’re done.

Now all we have to do is compare these two boxes. That’s it. In the scheme of things, which is worse? Where would you rather be? We are all built differently, but I am the sort that could never forgive myself for being right but unprepared. I can more easily forgive myself for being wrong and prepared. But that’s just me. Only you know which of these two boxes carries more weight for you. But if you picked the upper right box, then I need to ask, “What’s preventing you from taking action?”

Here’s a slight refinement of this thinking that allows for more subtlety than “true or false.” Suppose that we revisit our spectrum for a financial crisis that spans from “it’s not too bad” all the way to “everything breaks down and stops working for awhile.” Let’s assume that everyone has a different assessment of how likely any particular outcome is.

We might find that one person assesses the chance as very low that anything too bad will happen, while another person holds a nearly opposite view. In one important respect, they hold the same view; they both hold the possibility of a bad outcome as being greater than zero. When an outcome has a potentially huge impact, a prudent adult may decide to react to that risk, even though it is not very probable.

As long as some risk exists in your mind, and as long as the potential costs of not taking action are outweighed by the costs of taking action, then it makes sense to take action. That’s the case for action.

Okay, assuming you’ve decided that taking action makes sense, the hard part is where? We’ve been talking about some very big changes in the Crash Course, so where does one begin in this enormous universe of potential actions?

Here’s where I would recommend that you spend an hour and perform a self-assessment. There is an outline for this that you can download in the ACT section of ChrisMartenson.com.

It consists of three main areas. Your financial self-assessment should include your current & future needs, your current & future income, taking stock of all forms of wealth, and any issues concerning accessing your wealth that apply.

There are similar sorts of areas to cover that I am calling foundational that are equally as important, if not more, than the financial areas. Lastly, there are all of your physical needs to consider. A typical result of conducting a self-assessment is discovering that our lives are very much dependent on a lot of things we take for granted.

Once you’ve got your self-assessment complete, you have a pretty good idea of where you are strong and where you are not. The self-assessment, then, is your starting point – it represents your position in relation to the outside world.

Now we need to go to the outside world and rank all of the possible risks and challenges that exist, that we will then match against our self-assessment.

The three dimensions that we will use to begin bucketing the various events and risks are time (that is, how near or urgent is the risk or event), impact (is this a big deal or a little deal?), and likelihood (which is the same as the probability of the event).

To get a handle on time, consider grouping events on a timeline. In the first Horizon, which I see as running from zero to two years out, I place the housing bust, a credit bubble burst, and the possibility of a systemic banking failure. A bit further out, I foresee petroleum demand and supply crossing, issues with boomer retirement, and the possible emergence of very high inflation. Even further out, I see really big, hairy challenges like national insolvency, perhaps the end of fiat money, and the emergence of a new economic model.

Since I can’t respond to all of these at once, I mainly focus on those that are within the immediate Horizon. Again, you could place very different things in each of these Horizons, and those would be the ones you would use. These happen to be mine. For illustrative purposes, we’ll run through an example based on the possibility of a systemic banking failure.

Next, I segment things by Impact and Likelihood. If you understand insurance, you already understand this next process. Think of fire insurance on a house. We don’t carry it because such an event is especially likely (it is not), but because the impact is so catastrophic. That is, a prudent person will combine impact and likelihood to come to the decision that purchasing fire insurance makes sense.

So here’s a way to do that for the other areas in your life. Suppose we construct a simple 2x2 chart, and on this axis we break the likelihood of the event into “High” and “Low” buckets, while on the other axis we split the impact into “High” and “Low” buckets.

So something that is both low impact and low likelihood is something that we should not ever spend any of our precious time or resources on. Things that fall here are just not worth worrying about.

Anything that is high impact and high likelihood is a slam-dunk. We always attend to these, and we do them first.

Things that are of high impact but low likelihood require more thought, but generally we would usually attend to most of the things in this box next. After that, we’d sometimes attend to things that are low impact but high likelihood, especially if they happen to have easy or quick remedies.

So this becomes the area where events fall that I attend to. How you happen to fill this in will depend on your age, financial means, family situation, and a host of other factors

Because I consider there to be a 50% chance of a systemic financial collapse over the next 2 years, I place this as a high impact/high probability event, meaning that this is a risk that deserved and got a lot of my attention.

So let’s continue with the example. With this two-by-two grid in our minds, we might flesh out the risks associated with financial system collapse using a table that looks like this.

First, we might assess the likelihood of widespread bank closures to be “high,” the impact to be “high,” and therefore the rank of this event as “high.”

Then we might come to the same conclusions about our own personal banks. But we might assess the overall rank of a disruption in the food distribution network as “medium,” and dollar destruction as “medium” because it has both a high and a low which average out to medium. We might assess cuts to government spending as “low.” These are a few examples. Other things can and should be added to the list.

The point here is to assess the likelihood and impact of each event that we think applies to the scenario we are studying. When you’ve completed this, we’ll have a ranked list of events.

My recommendation is that when you do these exercises, that you do them with like-minded friends…they will think of things you will miss, it’s more fun, and will go faster.

Now you’ve got to generate a list. You do this by filtering those events that are imminent, likely, and of high impact, through your self-assessment. I guarantee when you do this, you will end up with an entirely too long list of things that you could possibly do.

It’s time to prioritize.

First, the list can quickly be broken into things that you can or will do, and things that you can’t or won’t do. One person might feel completely empowered to move their wealth around; another might have their wealth locked in an irrevocable trust.

Of the things that you can or will do, we will break those into three tiers of action, such that Tier 1 is always started and completed before beginning Tier 2, which will always precede Tier 3. This makes it much easier to get started, because the lists are much more manageable.

Of the things that you can’t or won’t do, your options include finding someone else who can do them (and this is where community comes in), or letting them go and not worrying about them anymore.

Back to our example, let’s suppose that after filtering your ranked events through your self-assessment you came up with a nice long list of actions that you’d like to undertake. Almost certainly, there are too many to do all at once, and it is time to use the three-tier system to identify and tackle the easiest, lowest cost, highest bang-for-the-buck stuff first.

So what is Tier 1? It consists of the easiest, quickest, and cheapest items that require minimal outside assistance and no substantive changes to lifestyle. In this example, then, we might decide that taking a bit of hard cash out of the bank would provide a reasonable buffer against the risk of being without purchasing power, should the banks and ATMs go “on holiday” for a while. This is easy and very do-able. Our major risk would be feeling a bit foolish later, after nothing happens and we go to redeposit that money in a bank. We might also decide to spread our bets around, just in case the bank holiday was not universal and only applied to some banks. Lastly, we might decide to hedge against the vast loss of purchasing power that the people of Argentina experienced while their banks were shuttered. Gold represents one of the few ways to hold a money-like asset entirely outside of the banking system. And we’d do all of these things before even thinking about starting the Tier 2 list.

And so we proceed to Tier 2, which consists of those Items that plug the biggest gaps in your self-assessment and require a significant investment of time, money, and energy.

For instance, implementing a saving program so that you can afford needed items, or thinking about ways to create a food buffer for your community, or getting involved with your neighbors and local scene to a greater extent.

After these items have been gone through, it is time to consider the Tier 3 items - the hard stuff. These are the biggest changes or life decisions on your list, such as changing where you live, or acquiring new skills, or maybe changing your job. The point is that you should resist the urge to spend any time or energy mulling these over until you’ve made serious progress on the Tier 1 and Tier 2 actions.

If all of this seems like too much work, and you were hoping Chapter 20 would be a more directive and simplified “here’s what you do” shopping list, I can only say that there are no easy answers for the magnitude of the challenges we face. This chapter could easily be an entire course itself, and future videos on my site will explore these questions in greater detail.

What I have been consistently trying to prepare people for, the whole way along, is that the next twenty years are going to be unlike the last twenty years.

Specifically, I think we each need to be prepared for a financial catastrophe – not because we are 100% sure it will happen, but because we can’t be 100% sure it won’t happen. Prudent adults identify and manage risks.

And I think we each need to be prepared for the possibility, the possibility, that a disruption in our basic support systems could happen. The things that surface in this line of thinking are considered very “out there” in today’s society, but barely 100 years ago our complete dependence on the just-in-time delivery of the basics of life would have been considered mad.

Lastly, I think the future is going to be about moving from an “I” to a “we” culture…back to a bygone era, where neighbors weren’t just nice to each other, but relied on each other. As an informed person, it is now your responsibility to help others as best you can. Perhaps this will be with their knowledge and consent; perhaps you will have to be more indirect if they are not yet ready to confront the changes.

And so I close with a personal call to action. Now that you’ve completed the Crash Course, I hope you’ll agree that the challenges we face are not being adequately addressed at the national or international levels. I created the Crash Course specifically to reach people, one at a time, because I hold the belief that some of the risks we face are moving much, much faster than the political process. I created the Crash Course so that you would understand what is going on and to do my very best to help you appreciate that the future could be quite different than the past.

I need your help spreading the word. The Crash Course has been seen by hundreds of thousands of people all across the globe, without any advertising on my part. This is because people like you have taken the time to pass it along to their friends, relatives, and coworkers. But I want it to be seen by millions. We need to create a tipping point of awareness around these issues.

And so I need your financial help, because I have dedicated four years, and much of my bank account, towards creating this body of work and then making it freely available to all. If you have gotten something from this, if this has touched you or even changed your thinking in an important way, then I hope you’ll consider “paying it forward” by making a financial contribution so that somebody else down the line gets to see it. How much? I would suggest an amount that is neither a stretch for you nor embarrassing.

The Crash Course needs to be seen in the halls of power, I need to train others to deliver the message, I need to travel to take the show to venues both large and small, I need to support the development of multiple language translations, and I need to expand the content, shrink it, add new material, and keep the whole effort moving forward.

In whatever way you can contribute to that, even if that’s sending the link along to one other person, I need your help. I will do my part if you will do yours. That is my promise to you. Because after all, the future will be defined by what WE do. Thank you for listening.

Crash Course: Chapter 19

FUTURE SHOCK


What I am offering is a comprehensive view of how all of our problems are actually interrelated and need to be viewed as such or solutions will continue to elude us.

So let’s review the key trends, which appear to be converging on a very narrow window of the future.

We began with an understanding of money and the fact that our money is loaned into existence, with interest, and that this results in powerful pressures to keep the amount of credit, or money, constantly growing by some percentage every year. This is the very definition of exponential growth, which we can easily see in our money, and, of course, inflation charts.

Keeping this dynamic in mind, we encountered the data on debt, which is really a claim on the future, vastly exceeding all historical benchmarks. The flip side to this, but a significant sociological trend in its own right, is the steady erosion of savings observed over the exact same period of time. Combined, we have the highest levels of debt ever recorded, coincident with some of the lowest levels of savings ever recorded.

And we saw that our failure to save extends through all levels of our society and even includes a desperate failure to invest in our infrastructure.

Next, we saw how assets, primarily housing, have been in a sustained bubble and that is now bursting and will take many years to play out. When credit bubbles burst, they result in financial panics that end up destroying a lot of capital. Actually, that’s not quite right; this quote says it better:

Panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it has been previously destroyed by its betrayal into hopelessly unproductive works.

- John Stuart Mill, Political Economist (1806 – 1873)

So we learned that a bursting bubble is not something that is easily fixed by authorities, because their attempts to limit further damage are misplaced. The damage has already been done. It is contained within too many houses, and too many strip malls sold for too high prices, and too many goods imported and bought on credit. All of that is done. All that’s left is figuring out who ends up holding the bag, and right now these guys are working hard to assure that that’s you, the taxpayer.

Then we learned that the most profound US government financial shortfall rests with a demographic problem that itself cannot be fixed by any act of law, or any level of optimism. It is simply a fact. An inconvenient fact of circumstance, much like gravity sometimes, but a fact nonetheless.

Even more than this, we learned that the assets boomers use to describe their wealth (stocks, and bonds, and real estate) all have to be sold to somebody at some point in order to extract their value. And we raised the uncomfortable observation that there simply are fewer people behind the boomers to whom these assets can be sold. When sellers exceed buyers, values fall.

Through all of this, the economic numbers that we reported to ourselves were systematically debased until they no longer reflected reality. If false data leads to bad decisions, then it’s no wonder that we find ourselves in our current predicament. Only by returning to an honest self-appraisal can we plot a strategic and meaningful course to the future.

Then we learned that energy is the source of all economic activity, and that oil is, by far, the most important source of energy. Our entire economic configuration is built around the assumption of unlimited growth in energy supplies, but this is an easily refuted proposition.

Individual oil fields peak and so do collections of them. And so Peak Oil is not so much a theory as it is an observation about how oil fields age. We then explored the tension that obviously exists between a monetary system that enforces exponential growth and the fact that our primary energy source has either already peaked or will soon. Somehow, the US has not even begun to invest in a future without cheap oil. We have no “Plan B.”

Lastly, we noted that the environment, meaning the world’s resources and natural systems upon which we depend, is exhibiting clear signs that our exponential population is driving exponential exploitation of resources, hastening their final depletion and altering ecosystems at an alarming rate. Also, we learned that even minor changes to the systems we depend on, such as shifting rainfall patterns, can create massive, usually unplanned, costs that will take priority over other needs.

And, yes, we’ve faced problems before, and we’ll face these as well. The concern comes when we view them all at once.

Placed on a timeline, we see that a bursting housing bubble is already happening just as the first wave of boomers enters retirement. At the same time, peak oil demand will outstrip supply, forcing an enormously expensive adjustment even as unknowable costs associated with resource depletion and a shifting climate lurk in the not-too-distant future. And sitting over all of this, limiting our options, will be our national failure to save and invest, and historically unprecedented levels of debt.

This timeline, stretching from now to 2020, reveals a truly massive set of challenges, converging on an exceptionally short window of time.

The question becomes, “Where will the money come from to apply to each of these challenges, if our savings are depleted and our debt levels already in uncharted territory?”

Any one of these events will prove to be a difficult strain on our national economy, while any two could be disruptive. If three or more happen simultaneously? It’s not hard to foresee the economic destruction of our country as a result, or perhaps the dollar utterly ruined as a store of wealth.

How many trillions will be required to fund boomer retirement? How many trillions to reshape our transportation infrastructure to accommodate Peak Oil? Where will the tens of trillions come from to make up the shortfalls in pensions and entitlement programs? How do we make good on these pension and entitlement promises while burdened with the highest debt loads ever seen? Where does the money come from to clean up the aftermath of a bursting housing bubble? How much more expensive will food and minerals be in the future, when oil has peaked but many more people are placing higher demands on increasingly marginal resources?

Each of these key trends or threats will take years, if not decades, to address, and yet we find them all parked almost directly in front of us, without any serious national discussions or planning. With every passing day we squander precious time, while the problems grow larger and more costly, if not thoroughly intractable. Buying time is not a strategy and will prove to be a disastrous tactic.

The mark of a mature adult is someone who can manage complexity and plans ahead. My opinion is that, with few exceptions, the current political and corporate leadership of this country are doing neither. We need to change this.

It is long past time to give up the adolescent notion that we can have our cake, eat it too, and borrow more when it’s gone.

It is time, quite simply, to return to living within our natural and economic budgets. We need to set priorities, set a budget, and stick to both.

And you? If you haven’t already, you need to begin to embrace the possibility that the path to the future might not be straight - it may take a few twists and turns and end up somewhere entirely unexpected - and that you happen to be alive at one of the most interesting points in human history, a time when a great shift may occur. This can be frightening or it can be exhilarating, and that choice is yours.

So what do we do about all this? What can you do, and what steps should you be considering right now?

Please join me for the final chapter of the Crash Course.

Thank you for listening.

Crash Course: Chapter 18

ENVIRONMENTAL DATA


Congratulations, you’ve made it to the final chapter of data. The remaining two chapters are summaries and conclusions.

Let me start right out by saying that this is not going to be about global warming. Instead, I want to focus on more linear, less complicated, and, I believe, more immediate concerns.

The primary intent of the Crash Course is to show you that there’s a bit of a disconnect between an exponential money system that enforces a creed of constant growth, and living on a spherical planet. In this section, a lot of you are going to find out that the planet is a whole lot smaller than you might have thought.

Most of the reason is contained in this curve right here. Population.

Consider that the entire human population finally reached 3 billion people in 1960, and that projections call for adding another 3 billion people in only 42 more years.

Before we contemplate 50% more humans in only 40 years, let me show you the pickle in which the current crop already finds itself.

This year there will be 70 million more humans on the surface of the planet than last year. 70 million. To put that in context, that is nearly three times as many people as live in the top ten most populous US cities combined. Worldwide population growth is equivalent to three of each of these cities, each year, for the next forty years.

More people means more demand for resources. More aluminum, more food, more consumer goods shipped to more places, and more cars. Always more cars.

And in case anybody has the misperception that maybe this isn’t such a big deal, because maybe these people will be living in China in a dirt hovel with maybe a donkey and a wicker basket, let me show you one of the fastest-growing cities in the world. In many respects, it is newer and more modern than most Western cities. This is what everybody aspires to.

People are the same the world over. We all want to live in bright, shiny cities, and we want to shop for nice things in nice districts. As a quick aside, China is said to have between 1.3 and 1.6 billion citizens. This means the entire US population of 300 million people, or 0.3 billion, would be referred to by the Chinese as a ‘rounding error.’

In fact, if we combine the top five most populous cities in the US we'd find that they have fewer inhabitants than the largest city in China.

But I want to return to the earlier statement that over the next forty years another 3 billion people will crowd onto the surface of the planet.

One trait that humans share with all organisms is that we use the easiest to obtain and the highest-quality resources first. When we use the earth’s resources, we start with the richest deepest soils, the largest trees, and the richest fishing waters. That is, we naturally exploit the highest quality resources first.

At this point, I want to recall that oil is a finite natural resource, and because of this we find that individual oil fields and collections of oil exhibit a classic extraction profile that resembles a bell curve.

We can broaden this concept to create a generalized resource extraction profile, where we start with the closest, richest, and most accessible, and highest grade resources first, before moving on to successively harder, and poorer, and thinner, or more distant resources. What this means is that over time, the energy required to obtain those resources goes up, as do the costs. About this, there really can be no doubt.

Here’s an example. When we first came to this country, we were finding some pretty spectacular things just lying around, like this copper nugget. Soon these [were] all gone, and we were onto smaller nuggets, and then onto copper ores that had some of the highest concentrations. Now?

Now we have things like the Bingham canyon mine in Utah. It is two and a half miles across and three-fourths of a mile deep, and it started out as a mountain. It sports a final ore concentration of just 0.2%. Do you think we’d have gone to this effort if there were still massive copper nuggets lying around in stream bed? No way.

Let’s take a closer look. You see that truck way down there? It’s fueled by petroleum; diesel, specifically. If we couldn’t spare the diesel to run that truck, what do you suppose we’d carry the ore out with? Donkeys? These trucks carry 255 tons/ per load. Suppose a donkey could carry 150 lbs. This means this truck carries the same in a single load as 3,400 donkeys. That’s quite a lot of donkeys.

My point here is that a hole in the ground a couple miles across and three fourths of a mile deep is a pretty spectacular display of the use of energy. When energy begins to get scarce, it seems unlikely to me that we’ll be digging too many more holes like it, which means copper will become scarce.

Now here’s where the concept gets interesting. The amount of energy and money that is required to extract any mineral or metal is a function of the ore grade. We would measure that as the percent of the ore that consists of the desired substance. So a 10% copper ore, for example, would contain 10% copper and 90%, uh, other stuff. Like, I don't know, rock or something. If we plot out how much other stuff we have to extract and then dispose of in pursuit of our desired substance, we get a chart that looks like this. Does it look familiar to you? It should; it’s an exponential chart.

It tells us that if we had an ore body with only 0.2% copper in it, we’d need to mine 500 pounds of ore in order to extract one pound of copper. I used this particular value because that happens to be the concentration of the Bingham Canyon mine. This helps to explain why this hole is so big. It tells us that without these giant trucks, we probably wouldn’t be mining such low ore grades. It means that we are already on the far right edge of this bell curve, in terms of energy and cost.

Do we do this because we like the challenge of low ore grades? No, we do it because we’ve already high-graded all the other known ore bodies, and this is what we are down to. We do it because it is the best option left. We do it because, in only 200 years, we’ve already burned through all [of] the better grades.

Let’s look at another example, coal. Coal production, as measured by tons mined, has been steadily growing at 2% per year since the 1940’s. This sort of stable, continuous, exponential growth is exactly what our economy and society demand. President Bush recently said we have 250 years of coal left, implying that this red arrow can continue in this direction for another 250 years. In other words, there is no urgency here; just a whole lot of coal waiting for us to come and get it.

But there’s a wrinkle in this story. Coal comes in several different grades. The most desirable is shiny, hard, black, anthracite coal. It yields the most heat when burned, has low moisture content, and is highly valued in the steel-making industry. Then comes bituminous coal, offering slightly less energy per pound of weight. And then subbituminous. And then finally something called lignite, which is really really low energy/high moisture stuff called brown coal that is pretty much only useful for burning. The next grade below lignite is, uh, rocks, which burn only slightly less vigorously than lignite.

Let’s look at the US history with mining anthracite. Notice a trend here? The reason we are not mining more of the stuff is because it’s pretty much all gone. Our entire bequeathment of anthracite, formed over hundreds of millions of years, was largely used over a span of about 100 years.

So we moved on to the next best stuff, bituminous coal, and here we might note that a peak in production was actually hit in 1990. Was this because we lost interest in this better grade of coal? No, it simply means we started to run out of it. Naturally, we then moved on to the next grade, subbituminous coal, which we see here making up the difference. And even lignite is getting into the game, although I don't expect to see this line really begin to move up until the subbituminous coal production's peaked out.

Now we get to the REALLY interesting part. Remember I said that the heat content, or available free energy, of coal got progressively worse with each grade? If we plot the total energy content of the coal mined, instead of the tonnage, we get a very different picture. Where the tonnage has been moving up in a nice steady neat 2% climb, we note that the total energy has leveled off and has climbed by exactly zero percent over the last 9 years. Ah! So we’re using more energy and spending more money to mine more and more coal, but we are receiving less and less back from those efforts? Let’s bring back this image again. Where do you think we are on this curve with respect to coal? Are the best years still in front of us? Do you feel secure with the “250 years of coal” that the President has said we have left?

The net energy of coal varies quite widely, but, in extracting lignite, we are already pretty far down this net energy curve.

Well, that’s okay; we can switch to uranium, right?

It turns out there is a little wrinkle in this story, too. When we look at the ore grades that exist for uranium, we see that they range from a high of over 20% to as low as 0.007%. Of all the ore grades proven and inferred to exist, 30% of them are greater than 0.1% in purity, leaving 70% below the grade of 0.1% Only one country, Canada, has proven reserves at a higher grade than 1%, while 11 countries have already entirely exhausted their uranium ores.

When we consider ore grades in such extremely low concentrations, the mining yields are quite dramatic, but not in a good way. Here’s where 70% of the known uranium reserves lie, requiring that anywhere from 500 pounds to 10,000 pounds of ore body be removed and processed to obtain a single pound of the mineral uranium oxide.

Clearly, as with copper, we are slipping down a slope of declining ore concentrations for uranium, and it cannot be disputed that greater energy and cost is demanded at this end of the curve.

Just in the sake of interest, France gets 90% of its electricity from nuclear power, but their uranium extraction peaked in the late 1980s, while the US passed its mining peak in the early 1980s. Both countries are well past Peak Uranium. If uranium is the energy of the future, the future lies somewhere outside of these two countries.

In fact, this same general theme naturally applies to anything we humans set our attention to. Phosphorus (a central mineral for farming), fish in the oceans, and every single source of metal are all telling the same story: We are running out of high grade materials. For most things, there is either already a shortage, or one will soon arise within the next few decades. And even these assessments assume that sufficient energy exists, allowing us to dig as many mile-deep pits as we wish in our quest for the last low-grade ores.

The story here is that we, as a species, all over the globe, have already mined the richest ores, found the easiest energy sources, and farmed the richest soils. It is said that for every bushel of wheat taken to market, a bushel of topsoil is lost. In that sense, given that it takes hundreds of years to form a single inch of topsoil, it can be said that our farmers are actually mining the soil.

We have taken several hundreds of millions of years of natural ore body and energy deposition, and thousands of years of soil creation, and largely burned through them in the few years since oil was discovered. It is safe to say that in human terms, once these are gone, man, they’re gone.

Another measure of human activity is that certain sensitive ecosystem stress markers are showing up. Species loss is one example, but there are many others, such as the dead zones that are appearing all over the globe in the shallow seas.

In fact, if one cares to look, there are red lights flashing all over our collective dashboard, ranging from species loss to oceanic depletion, to aquifer depletion, to topsoil loss, to energy depletion, and so on.

When I get even one red warning light on my dashboard, I pull right over to see what’s wrong. So far, my sense is that the world is stepping on the gas pedal instead

And driving every single bit of this is simply this: 70 million new people arrive on the surface of the planet each year. This means that a stunning 50% increase in the number of humans clamoring for natural resources will have to be negotiated over the next 40 years.

If we get clever about this, my sense is that we can do just fine. If we simply choose to grow [though] because that’s what our money system requires and that’s the default position for our politicians, then it seems likely that we’ll simply go faster until we hit a wall. The choice seems clear – either we undertake voluntary change now, or we'll face involuntary change later.

Now, back to the economy. Its primary assumption that the future will not just be bigger, but exponentially bigger, than the present, is going to have to contend with this reality. I submit to you that these limits are going to play out in very real terms over the next 20 years.

And so we can finally put all three “E”s in one spot. Our economy is based on an exponential money system that explicitly enforces a paradigm of continuous growth and implicitly assumes that the future will be much larger than the present. Growth requires energy; there is no getting around that; so the trends in Energy stand in stark contrast to the major underlying assumptions upon which our entire economy and our entire way of life are founded. Peak Energy is a very real, very close prospect.

In the rest of the Environment we see, very clearly, that we humans have high-graded virtually every resource and we're now working our way into poorer, thinner, and deeper territory as we seek the resources that define our lifestyles. Biosystem stress is flashing warning signs on our dashboard. Pretending that we can just carry on consuming as we have, while the world population increases by another 50% over the next 40 years, is just not a workable plan. In fact, it's no plan at all.

The continued exponential extraction of resources is a difficult enough story to believe just given the depleting ore grades that we are witnessing. But when we combine that reality with what we know about our energy supplies, then the story becomes even more unworkable.

Because each of the key environmental resources upon which we depend – metals, minerals, soil, water, oceanic fish, and all the rest – have been “high graded,” their continued extraction is going to increasingly be in competition for dwindling energy supplies that we’d also like to use to transport ourselves, to construct buildings, and to stay warm.

Taken together, it becomes quite clear that our challenge is to adapt to a world of less, not more. A world where we have to put more energy into carefully managing what we have than seeking out new sources to exploit. We have an economic system that must grow, coupled to an energy system that can’t grow, both of which are linked to a world of rapidly depleting resources. Out of the three “E”s, this is the one that is going to be doing the changing, and you need to be ready for that. That’s what this entire Crash Course has been about.

Let me make this even simpler. I want to be sure to get this point across very clearly. Our economy must grow to support a money system that requires growth, but is challenged by an energy system that can’t grow, and both of these are linked to a natural world that is rapidly being depleted.

Let me close by saying that if I thought these represented unfixable problems, I would not have dedicated, full time, the last four years of my life developing this Crash Course and raided my bank account to make it freely available to all. I am an optimist, and I want a better future of our own design.

We can no longer afford pleasant platitudes about 250 years of coal left, without appreciating the actual details involved.

It’s time to think big, develop a clear sense of priorities, and cast off the adolescent view that nothing bad is going to happen to us because so far it hasn’t. And it’s time to show that we care about future generations.

For better or worse, you happen to be alive at one of the most dramatic turning points in our species’ history that ranks right up there with climbing down out of the trees. The only real question is, what role do you want to play? Shall your life be filled with fear or a resolute sense of purpose?

The only way these challenges can become insurmountable is if we let them, by ignoring them for too long.

Okay, it’s time to place all of these challenges onto a single timeline so that we can assess the urgency of the risks that we face. Please join me for Chapter 19: Future Shock.

Thank you for your attention.