Saturday, May 30, 2009

UCTV: Howard Zinn

Conversations with History: Howard Zinn


(Transcript is still under revision)

Welcome to a Conversation with History. I'm Harry Kreisler of the Institute of International Studies. Our guest today is Howard Zinn. Howard Zinn is an activist, a historian, a writer, and a playwright. He is the author of many books, including A People's History of the United States, The Zinn Reader, and an autobiography called You Can't Be Neutral on a Moving Train. His three plays are Emma, Daughter of Venus, and Marx in Soho. He is a Professor Emeritus of History at Boston University.

BACKGROUND

Howard, welcome to Berkeley.

Thank you.

You've described in your autobiography a public lecture at which someone asked you from the audience, "How did you come by the particular ideas you now have?" I want to follow that line of inquiry. How did the circumstances of your youth affect the way you came to see the world?

Well, I think, of course, that was a very good question. It should be asked of all historians. I guess Growing up in a working class family, going to work in a shipyard at the age of 18, working for three years in a shipyard, getting into the sweat of industrial life and being aware of the difference between the way we lived our lives and the lives of those people we saw on the movie screen or in the magazines, developing a kind of class consciousness: I think that had an effect later on my teaching and writing of history. Then joining the Air Force, becoming a bombardier in the Air Force, going through a war, coming out of the war with very, very strong anti-war ideas, even though I was in "the best of wars," as they say -- the "good war." And then, teaching in Spelman College, my first teaching job. Teaching at a black women's college in the South -- Atlanta, Georgia. Seven years there. Going through and becoming involved in the Civil Rights Movement -- I think all of that shaped my thinking about history.

Let's talk a little about your youth, and then talk about the other things. How, specifically, do you think your parents shaped your character?

My parents were not political people at all. My parents were just ordinary. They were Jewish immigrants who worked in garment factories when they came here, and then my father became a waiter. You might say he moved up in the world. He went from being a factory worker to being a waiter, and then he became a head waiter. As far as political influence, no. The only influence they had on my life was my observation of their lives. My observation that my father was working very hard, an honest hard-working man. My mother working very hard, raising four sons. And yet, of course, they had nothing to show for it. That is, they were perfect counterpoints to the Horatio Alger myth that if you work hard in this country, you will get somewhere. I think that intensified my feeling about the injustice of an economic system in which there are people all over the country like my parents who work very, very hard and have nothing to show for it.

One of the things that your parents did was obtain for you a subscription to a collection of Dickens books, and so reading became very important to you and also offered you insights, right?

Oh, no doubt. Reading, reading, reading at an early age. My parents knew I was a reader even though they were not readers. My father was barely literate, my mother was somewhat literate. But they knew that I was interested in books and reading. They had no idea who Charles Dickens was, but they saw this ad, they could send away coupons and a dime for each book. So they got me this whole set of Dickens and I made my way through Dickens.

What did you learn from Dickens?

From Dickens what I got was this ferocious acknowledgement of the modern industrial system and what it does to people, and how poor people live and the way they are victimized, and the way the courts function. The way justice works against the poor. Yes, it was Dickens' class consciousness that reinforced my own. It was a kind of justification for the beliefs I was already developing. Yes; it told me, what reading very often does for you, tells you you are not alone in these secret thoughts you have. Not long ago I read in Kurt Vonnegut, him saying that somebody asked him, "Why do you write?" and he said, "The reason I write is to tell people: You are not alone."

You mentioned some of these events in your life, your experience in the war, Spelman College. I have a sense that life and learning for you are never separated; that life informs your scholarship and your scholarship informs the way you live your life.

I think that's true. There is a strong connection between the two. I think that's probably because I had so many, I think, vivid life experiences before I entered the academic world, before I entered the world of scholarship. By the time I went to college under the GI Bill at the age of 27, I'd already worked in the shipyard, I'd been in a war, I'd worked at various jobs, and so I brought to my reading of history those experiences. And then I brought to what I learned from my experiences something broader, that is, a historical perspective which actually reinforced the ideas that I'd gained from my own life.

Before you were in college you were working on the docks and you were involved in a demonstration at Times Square, and the police attacked. As I read in your autobiography and you write, "Henceforth I was a radical, believing that something fundamental was wrong in this country, not just the existence of poverty amidst great wealth, not just the horrible treatment of black people, but something rotten at the root requiring an uprooting of the old order: the introduction of a new kind of society -- cooperative, peaceful, egalitarian." That is an example of a kind of event that really changed your thinking, and that's an argument that you make in a lot of your history, that people can be changed by things that happen to them and act accordingly.

That's right. Sometimes it's one very vivid experience. Of course, it's never just one vivid experience, but it's that one experience coming on top of maybe a kind of only semi-conscious understanding that's been developed, and then it becomes crystallized by an event, and I think that's what happened to me at the age of 17, when I was hit by a policeman and knocked unconscious. I woke up and said, my God, this is America, where, yes there are bad guys and there are good guys, but the government is neutral. And when I saw that, no, the police are not neutral, the government is not neutral, that was a very radical insight.

Now moving through your life, you went on to school, working on the docks while you got your degree; you did your dissertation on [Fiorello] LaGuardia. What attracted you to LaGuardia? What did you find there that is a real and important theme in all your work?

I wasn't studying LaGuardia as a mayor, I was studying LaGuardia as a congressman in the 1920s, representing a poor district in East Harlem. As I read his papers, and I was very conscious that all through my education, from elementary school right up tu graduate school, the twenties was presented as the age of prosperity, and here I was reading the letters that LaGuardia's constituency in East Harlem were writing to him. They were writing, saying "My husband is out of work, my kids are hungry, and they're turning off the gas." LaGuardia was the voice of the poor in Congress. He was a lone voice in Congress of the twenties, in the jazz age, speaking out for the poor, speaking out against Coolidge's sending Marines to Nicaragua in 1926, speaking out for immigrants. He was a radical in Congress, and that, of course, appealed to me.

You say that LaGuardia, you write, dug beneath the surface and held to the public a view that had been hidden.

Yes, and what had been hidden is the fact that underneath this veneer of prosperity were huge numbers of people in this country who were living under desperate circumstances. To me that was important, because it was not just a commentary of the twenties, but like all history, anything you learn about the past also becomes a commentary on your own time. It suggested to me that in our own time, we must look beneath the statements of political leaders who say, "Ah! We have an economic miracle today! The Dow Jones average has gone up." You always have to look beneath the superficial signs of prosperity to see how people are living.

THE EARLY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (10:48)

Your first teaching assignment was at Spelman College, a black college for women in Atlanta. Tell us about that experience and the amazing events that occurred during your stay, that is, the large historical events.

Those seven years at Spelman College are probably the most interesting, exciting, most educational years for me. I learned more from my students than my students learned from me. Living in the South at a very interesting time, the late fifties, early sixties, just before the onset of the big Civil Rights Movement, and then during those years, the early sixties, I learned so much.

For one thing, I began to look at history in a different way. I began to look at history from a black point of view. It looks very different from a black point of view. The heroes are different, and the eras get different names. The Progressive Era is no longer the Progressive Era, because it's the era in which more black people are lynched than in any other period in American history. I began reading black historians. Reading Raford Logan, reading DuBois, reading John Hope Franklin, reading E. Franklin Frasier, and things that weren't on my reading list right up in graduate school, Columbia University.

So that was one thing, learning about history, but the other thing, more important I think, was learning by being in the movement. By moving out from Atlanta to Albany, Georgia, and demonstrations in Selma, Alabama, Mississippi, Hattiesburg, Greenwood, Greenville, Jackson. By becoming a kind of participant writer in the movement, it taught me something very important about democracy, about the democracy that I had been taught in junior high school, and which people even learn in higher education: institutions, constitution, checks and balances, voting, all those things that political scientists concentrate on. Obviously, that was not democracy. Those things had failed to produce equality for black people, had failed, in fact, to enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments. Every president in the United States for a hundred years had violated his oath of office by not enforcing the 14th and 15th Amendments.

And what happened, that democracy came alive finally, when black people took to the streets and demonstrated and sat in and got arrested by the tens of thousands and created a commotion that was heard around the world. So it was an insight, suddenly. It shouldn't have been, I should have known that from before, that democracy comes alive not when government does anything, because government cannot be depended on to rectify serious injustices. It comes alive when people organize and do something about it. The Southern black movement taught me that.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (13:59)

You write in your autobiography, "I began to realize no pitifully small picket line, no poorly attended meeting, no tossing out of an idea to an audience or even to an individual should be scorned as insignificant."

I suppose that's something that people learn when they participate in social movements, especially if they participate in the movement long enough to see it develop into something that at first seems impotent and impossible and then becomes a force and brings about change. I saw that in the Civil Rights Movement, and I saw that in the anti-war movement. Because in both cases, you could see little things happen which seemed as if they would get nowhere. It seems as if you are up against forces that cannot be dislodged.

Here, the change takes place in the Civil Rights Movement in the most dangerous parts of the country, in the deep South, where everything is controlled by the white power structure and blacks don't have the wherewithal. The only thing they have is their bodies, their determination, their unity, their willingness to take risks. And, yes, it starts with small things. You don't think they are going to get anywhere. Nobody really knew in the late fifties or even in the first years of the sixties that anything big would happen, and yet it did.

The anti-war movement starts off with small anti-war gestures in little gatherings around the country and it seems impossible. How are you going to stop the greatest military power on earth from continuing a vicious war? And yet, those small meetings, demonstrations, turned gradually, over several years, into a movement which became powerful enough to cause the government to think twice about continuing a war.

You state a part of your philosophy of history: "I'm convinced of the uncertainty of history, of the possibility of surprise, of the importance of human action in changing what looks unchangeable." We can actually go to a concrete example in your life. You participated in one of the first (if not the first) teach-ins on the Vietnam War on the Boston Commons very early in the game. It was years later that you were drawing massive crowds to a similar event on the Commons.

That's right. That very first anti-war meeting on the Boston Commons in the spring of '65, when Johnson had begun the real escalation of the war, begun the bombing, begun the dispatch of large numbers of troops, we had our first anti-war meeting on the Boston Commons, perhaps a hundred people showed up. Herbert Marcuse spoke, I spoke, a few other people spoke. It looked pitiful. This was '65. In '69, another meeting on the Boston Commons, a hundred thousand people are there. In those few years, something very important had taken place. I think that showed the possibility of change if you persist.

EXPERIENCING WAR (17:38)

Your involvement in the anti-war movement was informed, in part, by your experience as a soldier. I want to talk about one specific incident that you write about. In one of the last bombing missions of the war, you were a bombardier on a plane that essentially was one of the first uses of napalm, on an innocent French village called Rohan. Tell us about that experience and what you learned from it, and how it affected your activism in the anti-war movement but also your view of war in general.

You have to understand that I enlisted in the Air Force. I volunteered. I was an enthusiastic bombardier. To me it was very simple: it was a war against fascism. They were the bad guys, we were the good guys. One of the things I learned from that experience was that when you start off with them being the bad guys and you being the good guys, once you've made that one decision, you don't have to think anymore, if you're in the military. From that point on, anything goes. From that point on, you're capable of anything, even atrocities. Because you've made a decision a long time ago that you're on the right side. You don't keep questioning, questioning, questioning. You're not Yossarian, who questions.

The protagonist of Catch-22.

That's right. And so what happened with me, I was an enthusiastic bombardier, as I say. The war was over, presumably -- a few weeks from the end. Everybody knew the war was about to end in Europe. We had been flying bombing missions out of England over the Continent. We didn't think we were flying missions anymore. No reason to fly. We were all through France, into Germany. The Russians and Americans had met on the Elbe. It was just a matter of a few weeks. And then we were awakened in the wee hours of the morning and told we were going on a mission. And the intelligence, the so-called intelligence people, who brief us before we go into a plane, tell us we are going to bomb this tiny town on the Atlantic coast of France called Rohan, near Bordeaux, and we are doing it because there are several thousand German soldiers there. They are not doing anything. They are not bothering anyone. They are waiting for the war to end. They've just been bypassed. And we are going to bomb them.

What's interesting to me later, in thinking about it, is that it didn't occur to me to stand up in the briefing room and say, "What are we doing? Why are we doing this? The war is almost over, there is no need." It didn't occur to me. To this day, I understand how atrocities are committed. How the military mind works. You are taught to just mechanically go through the procedures that you have been taught, you see.

So, we went over Rohan, and they told us in the briefing that we were going to drop a different kind of bomb this time. Instead of the usual demolition bombs, we are going to drop, carry in our bomb bay, thirty 100-pound canisters of what they called jellied gasoline, which was napalm. It was the first use of napalm in the European war. We went over. We destroyed the German troops and also destroyed the French town of Rohan. "Friendly fire." That's what bombing does.

To this day, when I hear the leaders of the country say, "Well, this is precision bombing and we are being very careful, and we are only bombing military ..." -- nonsense. No matter how sophisticated the bombing technology, there is no way you can avoid killing non-military people when you drop bombs. But in any case, it wasn't until after the war that I looked back on that. In fact, it wasn't until after Hiroshima and Nagasaki that I looked back on that. Because after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which at first I had welcomed like everybody at that time did -- "Oh yes, the war is going to be over," -- and then I read John Hershey's book Hiroshima, and for the first time the human consequences of dropping the bomb were brought home to me in a way I hadn't thought of. When you are dropping bombs from 30,000 feet you don't hear screams. You don't see blood.

I suddenly saw what the bomb in Hiroshima did. I began to rethink the whole question of a "good war." I came to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a good war. They may start off with good intentions, at least on the part of the people who fight in them. Generally not on the part of the people who make the decision; I doubt they have good intentions. But there may be good intentions on the part of the GIs who believe, yes, we are doing this for a good cause. But those good intentions are quickly corrupted. The good guys become the bad guys. So I became convinced that war is not a solution, fundamentally, for any serious problem. It may seem like a solution, like a quick fix, a drug. You get rid of this dictator, that dictator, as we did Hitler, Mussolini. But you don't solve fundamental problems. In the meantime, you've killed tens of millions of people.

HISTORY (23:12)

Let's talk a little about how you apply these insights from your own experience to the doing of history. Let's talk about your philosophy of history. You've argued that what is selected and who selects the facts for history is very important. In fact, you quote Orwell, who wrote "Who controls the past controls the future. And who controls the present controls the past." So, I'm curious. What did these life experiences, your insight, how did that lead you to focus on this alternative history, for example, of the United States?

My growing up and going to work and becoming, as I say, class conscious; and then going to school and reading in my history books, looking for things that I had begun to learn on my own. Working in a shipyard and actually organizing young shipyard workers and getting interested in labor history, reading on my own the history of labor struggles in this country, and then looking in the history books that were given me in school, looking for the large textile strike of 1912, the Colorado coal strike of 1913, looking for Mother Jones, looking for Emma Goldman, Bill Haywood. They weren't there.

So it became clear to me that the really critical way in which people are deceived by history is not that lies are told, but that things are omitted. If a lie is told, you can check up on it. If something is omitted, you have no way of knowing it has been omitted. And so maybe I'm conscious of the fact ... looking through history, looking at other things, looking at the treatment of race, looking at the treatment of women; it made me always ask the question: what has been left out of this story? And [it made me] look for other things. So when I started out my book, and I knew I had to start out with Columbus, because that's what all histories of the United States start off with, I said, "What is left out?" The Indian point of view. And then Las Casas comes into the picture, telling the other side of the story.

The Jacksonian period, our Jacksonian democracy: Arthur Schlesinger writes this glowing book about Andrew Jackson and Jacksonian democracy. What else was going on? And then I find out that Jackson is responsible for the brutal treatment of the Indians in the Southeast, driving them across the Mississippi, thousands of them dying. Jackson is a racist. Jackson is a slave owner. Under Jackson, the industrial system begins with the mill girls going to work at the age of 12 and dying at the age of 25. I became conscious of omissions in history, and that's what I was determined to try to remedy.

As you write these accounts of the forgotten, and when one reads your books, you really get inspiration from their courage, the courage that has not appeared in the [standard] texts. But on the other hand, there is your courage, and I'm curious about the roots of that. The courage to take these stands both as a historian in what you write and as an activist. What are the roots of that courage in your life?

It's not a courage to me, it's a sad commentary, that we think it requires a lot of courage just to speak your mind. I'm not going to be executed. I'm not even going to be given a long jail sentence. I may be thrown into jail for a day or two, and that has happened to me eight to nine times. I may be fired, I may get a salary decrease, but these are pitiful things compared to what happens to people in the world. So it doesn't take much courage to do that. I had two friends, my closest friends in the Air Force, both of whom were killed in the last weeks of the war, and I think after you've been through a war experience, and after you've been aware of people dying, and somebody says, "Are you willing to risk your job? Are you willing to risk a salary cut? Are you willing to risk that you won't get tenure?" -- these are pitiful risks compared to the risks that people have taken in the world.

Many people, though, don't have that little bit of courage, so it makes a difference.

They need historical perspective.

Personal perspective, you seem to be saying, too.

Yes.

WRITING HISTORY (28:26)

I'm curious of, let's talk a little about writing. One of the, I think, really important motifs here is finding the story, but then telling the story in a lucid, clear manner. Is it hard for you to write or does it flow easily?

I don't have to struggle to write simply. That comes naturally to me. Maybe if I'd gone straight through college, graduate school, Ph.D., maybe I would have had the same thing happen to me that happens to people who go through the academic mill, in that it cripples their ability to write clearly. Really. I grew up reading Upton Sinclair and Jack London and reading stuff that was clear and lucid. Or Dickens. Dickens was not a florid writer. He's a narrator. And so, yes, I think that writing simply came naturally to me. I would have to struggle to write academic prose.

You're a person who is up front about his values and up front about the emotion that he feels about injustice. I want you to talk about how your writing, do you think, is affected by these honesties about both your values and your emotions. Is that a plus in making it easier to tell these stories?

I know that there is a kind of conventional wisdom, or, as I put it, conventional foolishness, that if you're passionate about something you can't really write well about it. In the arts we accept passion, and we accept that passion in the arts makes the arts come alive. But we don't accept it in scholarship, and therefore we draw a false line between the arts and scholarship. But I believe that being passionate about your scholarly work, being passionate about history is something that needs to be expressed in order to be honest. I think there's nothing more important than being honest about your feelings. Otherwise you are presenting something that is not yourself.

And also there is another element to it, and that is, in being passionate about something, you are giving that intensity to what you write, which magnifies its power. In a way, you're trying to make up for the fact that people who have written other things dominate the ideological landscape. Because you're a minority voice, you have to speak louder, more eloquently, more vividly, more passionately.

You have written, talking now about history and the importance of education, and you said "It confirmed what I learned from my Spelman years, that education becomes most rich and alive when it confronts the reality of moral conflict in the world."

It's interesting that you bring up Spelman College in connection with that, because there's an example of the interaction between education and activism. When my students went into town for the first time to sit in, to demonstrate, to be arrested in spring of 1960, I had colleagues at Spelman College, Morehouse, Atlanta University -- the complex of black colleges -- who said, "This is bad, they are hurting their education." One of them wrote a letter to the Atlanta Constitution saying "I deplore what my students are doing; they are cutting class; they are missing out on their education." And I thought, what a pitiful, narrow, cramped view of education this is. To think that what these students are going to learn in books can compare to what they will learn about the world, about reality. Then they will come from town, they will come back from prison, and then when they will go into the library, they will go into it with an enthusiasm and a curiosity that didn't exist before.

You also wrote, "I wanted students, "I think you are talking about your years at B.U. [Boston University] "to leave my classes not just better informed, but more prepared to relinquish the safety of silence, more prepared to speak up, to act against injustice wherever they saw it." What then is the link in the importance of history to activism?

I think the learning of history is a way of declaring, "I wasn't born yesterday; you can't deceive me." If I don't have any history, then whatever you, the person in authority, the president at the microphone announcing we must bomb here, we must go there, the president has the field all to himself. I cannot counteract, because I don't know any history. I can only believe him. I was born yesterday. What history does is give you enough data so that you can question anything that is said from on high. You can measure the claims that are being made by the people in authority against the reality. And you can look at similar claims that were made before, and see what happened then. Here's a president who's saying we're going to war for democracy. And then you go back through history and say, "How many times have presidents said we're going to war for democracy, and what have those wars really been about?" So yes, the history, I think, can clarify things, prepare you for dealing with the duplicities of the real world.

I just happened to have re-read your chapter on the Mexican Wars, and it's exactly what you're saying. As you hear the issues, the themes, the concerns of that time, which you often don't find in a normal history book, they resonate so much with the experiences of the Vietnam War.

I remember the New York Times ran a poll once, asking high school students questions about history. The idea was to find out how much high school students know. They do this every once in a while, basically to prove that high schools students are ignorant and that the people who make those polls are smart. The questions that the New York Times asked were questions like, "Who was the president during the Mexican War?" A really important question. Here's the New York Times, presumably the ultimate in journalism. This is not the Star, the National Enquirer. This is the New York Times and they're asking "Who was president during the Mexican War?" instead of asking, "How did we get into the Mexican War? How did it start? What was at stake? What lies were told? How much discussion was there in Congress before there was a declaration of war? How much desertion was there in the American army as a result of the American soldiers waking up and asking what are we doing here in this bloody mess?"

It's an example of where somebody at the start of the Vietnam War, listening to the claims of our government and how we must go into Vietnam for this or for that, knowing about the Mexican War, knowing about the Spanish-American War, knowing about the war in the Philippines, knowing about World War I -- well, people who knew that history would not accept blandly what we were being told!

CONCLUSION (37:16)

Is it fair to say of you, and this is the sense I get from reading your work, that you retain a sweet optimism about human nature?

I don't know if I'd use the word sweet.

Okay. Well, your smile is making me add that adjective.

I see. I prefer to think of it as a cold, rational optimism.

Yes. As a historian I would expect that of you.

Of course. Historians must not be sweet. But optimistic ... well, yes, a cautious optimism. Cautious in the sense that I'm not positive that things are going to go well. The future is indeterminate. But after all, the future depends on what we do now. If we are pessimistic now, we are doomed in the future. If we give up at this point then we know nothing good is going to happen. If we act on the assumption that there's a chance that something good may happen, then we have a possibility. Not a certainty, but a possibility. So I believe it's useful, it's pragmatic to be optimistic. But not only that, not simply an act of faith, but also because there is historical evidence for the fact that when people act, persist, get together, organize, they can bring about changes. There haven't been enough changes. So you can look at that and say, not enough. True. But the fact that some changes have been made. The fact that labor, by struggling, won the eight-hour day. The fact that blacks in the South did away with the signs of segregation. The fact that women changed the consciousness of this country about sexual equality. Even though those are only beginnings, that historical experience suggests reason to think it is possible that other things may change.

What, then, is the link between theory and action do you think that everyone should understand?

I think that it's important people read and learn, thinking, "I'm not doing this just because it's fun or because it will enhance my professional career but for the purpose of learning." This goes back to John Dooley, Alfred Lord White, that the purpose of learning is to have an effect on a world in which mostly people don't have the leisure, don't have the opportunity, don't have the breathing space, don't have the physical health even, to read a book or learn. So we who can do those things have an obligation to create a world in which maybe then people can do learning for fun.

What advice would you give to students who might view this tape and read your text, A People's History of the United States? What lesson would you suggest that they might learn from your life, that they might apply to theirs?

One thing is, because I claim there are many things you can learn from me, oh so many things they can learn from me!

One thing is that even if you're engaged in a movement where the future of that movement is uncertain, even if you're trying to achieve an objective which looks very very far away, simply working for it makes life more interesting and more worthwhile. So you don't have to look for some victory in the future. The very engagement with other people in a common struggle for something that you all believe in, that is a victory in itself.

Thank you very much Professor Zinn for being with us today.

Thank you for those good questions.

Thank you and thank you very much for joining us for this Conversation with History.

Chomsky On Gaza

MIT World: Chomsky on Gaza (13 Jan 2009)

CHOMSKY: Distorted Morality

Distorted Morality: America's War on Terror?


(Delivered at Harvard University, February 2002)

Thanks. I just got back from Brazil where they don't have any fire codes and if you think this is uncomfortable you should see a meeting there -- people packed so tight that there was a good question whether the oxygen level would suffice. Fortunately, there wasn't a fire or it would have been a huge catastrophe.

Well, the title, you noticed, had a question mark after it and the reason for the question mark is that whatever has been happening for the past several months and is going on now, and however you evaluate it -- like it, hate it, or whatever -- it's pretty clear that it cannot be a war on terror. In fact, that's close to a logical necessity, at least if we accept certain pretty elementary assumptions and principles, so let me try to make those clear at the outset.

The first principle guideline, if you like, is that we ought to, I will try and I think that we should, bend over backwards to give the benefit of the doubt to the United States government whenever it's possible. So, that if there is any dispute about how to interpret something, we will assume they're right.

The second guideline is that we should take very seriously the pronouncements of leadership especially when they are made with great sincerity and emotion. So, for example, when George Bush tells us that he is the most devout Christian since the Apostles, we should believe him, take him at his word and we should therefore conclude that he certainly has memorized, over and over again, in his Bible reading classes and in church, the famous definition of "hypocrite" that's given in the gospels. Namely, the hypocrite is the person who applies to others standards that he refuses to apply to himself. So if you are not a hypocrite you assume that if something is right for us then it's right for them and if it is wrong when they do it, it is wrong when we do it. That is really elementary and I assume that the President would agree and all of his admirers as well. So those are the principles that I would like to start with.

Well, a side comment. Unless we can rise to that minimal level of moral integrity we should at least stop talking about things like human rights, right and wrong, and good and evil, and all such high afflatus things because all our talk should be dismissed, in fact, dismissed with complete repugnance unless we can at least rise to that minimal level. I think that's obvious and I hope there would be agreement on that, too.

Well, with that much in place -- just that much for background -- let me formulate a thesis. The thesis is that we are all total hypocrites on any issue relating to terrorism. Now, let me clarify the notion "we." By "we," I mean people like us -- people who have enough high degree of privilege, of training, resources, access to information -- for whom it is pretty easy to find out the truth about things if we want to. If we decide that that is our vocation, and in the case in question, you don't really have to dig very deep, it's all right on the surface. So when I say "we," I mean that category. And I definitely mean to include myself in "we" because I have never proposed that our leaders be subjected to the kinds of punishment that I have recommended for enemies. So that is hypocrisy. So if there are people who escape it I really don't know them and have not come across them. It's a very powerful culture. It's hard to escape its grasp. So that's thesis number one, we are all total hypocrites, in the sense of the gospels, on the matter of terrorism. The second thesis is stronger, namely, that the first thesis is so obvious that it takes real effort to miss it. In fact, I should go home right now because it is obvious. Nevertheless, let me continue and say why I think both theses are correct.

Well, to begin with, what is terrorism? Got to say something about that. That is supposed to be a really tough question. Academic seminars and graduate philosophy programs and so on -- a very vexing and complex question. However, in accordance with the guidelines that I mentioned, I think there is a simple answer, namely, we just take the official U.S. definition of terrorism. Since we are accepting the pronouncements of our leaders literally, let's take their definition. In fact, that is what I have always done. I have been writing about terrorism for the last twenty years or so, just accepting the official definition. So, for example, a simple and important case is in the U.S. army manual in 1984 which defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature.

Well, that seems simple, appropriate. A particularly good choice because of the timing: 1984. 1984, you will recall, was the time that the Reagan Administration was waging a war against terrorism. Particularly what they called state-supported international terrorism a "plague spread by depraved opponents of civilization itself" in a "return to barbarism in the modern age" -- I'm quoting [Secretary of State] George Shultz who was the administration moderate. The other guideline is that we will keep to the moderates, not the extremists.

So that's 1984, Reagan had come into office a couple of years earlier. His administration had immediately declared that the war against terrorism would be the focus of U.S. foreign policy and they identified two regions as the source of this plague by depraved opponents of civilization itself -- Central America and the Middle East. And there was quite wide agreement on that and so, in 1985, for example -- every year the Associated Press has a poll of editors on the most important story of the year -- and in 1985, the winner was Middle East terrorism. So they agree. Right towards the end of that year, 1985, Shimon Peres, Israel's Prime Minister, came to Washington and Reagan and Peres denounced the evil scourge of terrorism, referring to the Middle East. Scholarship and experts also agree.

There is a huge literature for the last twenty years on terrorism, particularly state-supported international terrorism. We don't have time review it but a good illustration, which I will keep to, is the December 2001 issue of the journal Current History, a good and serious journal. Its article called "America at War" includes leading historians, specialists and experts on terrorism and they identify the 1980s as the era of [state-supported] state-sponsored terror, agreeing with the Reagan Administration. I agree with that, too. I think it was the era of state-sponsored international terrorism. One leading author, Martha Crenshaw, says that in that era the United States adopted a pro-active stance to deter the plague. Mostly, it's about the Middle East but Central America is occasionally mentioned. For example U.S. support for one or two authors or co-authors from the Brookings Institution describe the [U.S. War against] U.S. Contra War against Nicaragua as a model for how to fight a war against terrorism, they say that that was a model for U.S. support for the Northern Alliance in the current phase of the war against terrorism. The seeds of contemporary terrorism however are much deeper, though.

The major historian in the group -- David Rapoport, the leading academic specialist on terrorism, editor of the Journal of Terrorism and so on -- he points out that it goes back to -- the origins of modern terrorism, like Osama bin Laden -- it goes back to the early 1960s and I am quoting him now, when "Vietcong terror against the American Goliath ... kindled the hopes that the Western heartland was vulnerable ..." I won't comment on that but, just as an exercise, you might try to find a historical analog to that statement somewhere. I'll just leave it at that. Without commenting, if you check through the scholarly literature you'll find the same story all the time, virtually no exceptions.

The world agreed with the Reaganites, too. In 1985, right after Reagan and Peres had denounced the evil scourge of terrorism, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning terrorism, and in 1987, it passed a much stronger resolution and a much more explicit one denouncing terrorism in all its forms and calling on all states to do everything they can to fight against the plague and everything you like. It's true that that wasn't unanimous. There was one abstention, namely Honduras, and two votes against -- the usual two. They gave their reasons for voting against the major UN resolution on international terrorism, namely, both states -- the United States and Israel -- pointed to the same paragraph as the reason for their negative vote. It was a paragraph that said that nothing in the present resolution could in anyway prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the United Nations Charter, of people forcibly deprived of that right ... particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation, or could deprive them of the right to obtain support for others in these ends in accord with the charter with the United Nations. That was the offending paragraph, and it is easy to understand why it raised a serious problem for the United States and Israel. The African National Congress was identified officially as a terrorist organization in the United States and South Africa was officially an ally. But the phrase "struggle against colonial and racist regimes" plainly referred to the struggle of the ANC against the apartheid regime. So that's unacceptable. The phrase "foreign occupation," everyone understood, referred to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, then in its 20th year, extremely harsh and brutal from the beginning and continuing only because of decisive U.S. military, economic and diplomatic support that runs up to the present. So, obviously, that was unacceptable. So therefore it was 153 to 2 with one abstention. So it wasn't totally unanimous. It wasn't reported and it has disappeared from history. You can check to find out. Incidentally, that's standard practice. When the master says something is wrong, it's down the memory hole, doesn't get reported and it's forgotten. But it's there, if you want to look, you can discover it, I'll give you the sources if you like.

Well, Reagan at that time, let's recall, he and Peres were talking about the evil scourge of terrorism in the Middle East. George Shultz didn't entirely agree. He thought that what he called the most alarming manifestation of state-sponsored terrorism was frighteningly close to home. Namely, it was a "cancer ... in our land mass," a cancer right nearby that was threatening to conquer the hemisphere with a "revolution without borders" -- a rather interesting propaganda fabrication, revealed to be a fraud instantly, but always used repeatedly afterwards, even by the same journals that explained why it was a total fabrication. It was just too useful to abandon. And this is also interesting, if you think about it, the fabrication had a certain element of truth in it, an important element of truth. We can come back to that if you like. Anyhow, this cancer in our land mass was threatening to conquer everything, openly following Hitler's Mein Kampf, and we plainly had to do something about that.

There is a serious day in the United States called Law Day -- elsewhere in the world it is called May Day -- May 1st, a day for the support of the struggles of the American workers for an eight hour day. But in the United States, it's a jingoist holiday called Law Day. On Law Day 1985, President Reagan declared a national emergency because the government of Nicaragua constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States..." That was renewed annually. George Schultz informed Congress that we must cut the Nicaraguan cancer out and not by gentle means, things are too serious for that. And so, to quote Schultz -- recall, the administration moderate, the "good cop" -- to quote Schultz, he said: "Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table." He condemned those who advocate "utopian legalistic means like outside mediation, the United Nations, the World Court while ignoring the power element of the equation." I'll avoid quoting hard-liners. At that time, the United States was exercising the "power element of the equation" with mercenary forces based in Honduras attacking Nicaragua. They were under the supervision of John Negroponte who was just appointed to run the diplomatic side of the diplomatic component of the current war on terror as the UN ambassador. The military component of the current war on terror is Donald Rumsfeld who at that time was Ronald Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East -- the other place where the plague was raging through 1985. In fact, the United States at that time was also blocking "utopian, legalistic means" that were being pursued by the World Court, the Latin American countries and others, and it continued to block those means, right until the end, until the final victory of its terrorist wars throughout Central America.

Well, how was the war against state-sponsored terrorism waged in those two regions by the people who in fact are leading the new phase? (So pretty close historical continuity, not just those two, of course.) Well, just to illustrate, let's pick the peak year, the worst year, 1985 in the Middle East, top story of the year. So who wins the prize for the worst acts of terrorism in the Middle East in 1985? Well, I know of three candidates, maybe you can suggest a different one. One candidate is a car bombing in Beirut in 1985, The car was placed outside a mosque. The bomb was timed to go off when people were leaving to make sure it killed the maximum number of people. It killed, according to the Washington Post, 80 people. It wounded over 250, mostly women and girls leaving the mosque. There was a huge explosion so it blew up the whole street, killing babies in beds and so on and so forth. The bomb was aimed at a Muslim sheik who escaped. It was set off by the CIA in collaboration with British intelligence and Saudi intelligence and specifically authorized by William Casey, according to Bob Woodward's history of Casey and the CIA. So that is a clear-cut example of international terrorism. Very unambiguous and I think it is one of the candidates for the prize for the peak year of 1985.

Another candidate surely would be the so-called Iron Fist operations that Shimon Peres' government was carrying out in occupied southern Lebanon in March of 1985. This is in southern Lebanon, which was under military occupation in violation of the Security Council order to leave, but with U.S. authorization, so it's irrelevant. The Iron Fist operations were targeting what the high command called "terrorist villagers" in southern Lebanon. It included many massacres and atrocities and kidnapping of people for interrogation and taking them to Israel and so on. It reached new depths of calculated brutality and arbitrary murder, according to a Western diplomat familiar with the region, who was observing. There was no pretense of self-defense, rather it was openly undertaken for political ends. It was conceded, it wasn't even argued. So that's a clear case of international terrorism although here we might say that it is aggression. I'll call it just "international terrorism" in line with the principle that we bend over backwards to give the United States the benefit of the doubt. Of course, this is a U.S. operation: Israel does it because they are given arms, aid and diplomatic support by the United States. So we will decide to call this just "international terrorism," not the much more serious war crime of aggression. The same, incidentally, was true of the much worse operations of 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon and killed maybe twenty thousand or so people, again with crucial U.S. military, economic and diplomatic support. The U.S. had to veto a couple of Security Council resolutions to keep the slaughter going, provide the arms, and so on, for it. So it's a U.S.-Israeli invasion, if we are honest. The goal was to install a friendly regime in Lebanon and oust the PLO, which would help persuade the Palestinians to accept Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza. That's actually accurate and I have to compliment the New York Times in saying that on January 24th. As far as I know, that's the first time in mainstream U.S. literature that anyone has dared to say what was absolutely common knowledge in Israel and in the dissident literature 20 years ago. I was writing this in 1983 just using Israeli sources but it couldn't penetrate U.S. commentary. You might check and see. As far as I know, this was the first breakthrough. I am not sure the reporter understood what he was saying. But anyway he did say that. James Bennet, January 24th, prize for James Bennet for telling the truth after 20 years. And it's true and, of course, it's a textbook illustration of international terrorism. This time we have to bend over backwards pretty far to call it international terrorism because it is hard to say why this isn't overt aggression -- the kind of action for which U.S. and Israeli leaders should be subjected to Nuremberg trials for real serious war crimes. But, again, let's keep to the guidelines and let's say it's only international terrorism. Well, that's the second example, the Iron Fist operations.

Third, the only other example from 1985 that I know of took place a few days before Shimon Peres arrived in Washington to join Reagan in denouncing the evil scourge of terrorism. Shortly before that, Peres sent the Israeli air force to bomb Tunis killing 75 people, civilians, torn to shreds with smart bombs. It was all rather accurately and graphically depicted by a highly respected Israeli reporter in the Hebrew press in Israel and corroborated by other sources. The United States cooperated with that by withdrawing the Sixth Fleet so that they did not have to inform their ally, Tunisia, that the bombers were on their way, presumably getting refueled on the way. So that's the third candidate. I don't know of any other candidates that even come close to being candidates... Incidentally, George Schultz, the moderate, immediately after the bombing, he telephoned the Israeli Foreign Minister to say that the United States had considerable sympathy for this operation but he backed away from open support for massive international terrorism or maybe aggression when the Security Council unanimously condemned the attack as an act of armed aggression. The United States again abstaining against that.

So those are the top three cases that win the prize for 1985, to my knowledge, and again I'll assume that these are just international terrorism so we are not calling for Nuremberg trials. Just more "international terrorism" by "depraved opponents of civilization itself" and examples which are pretty hard to miss, remember, because these are the peak stories of the year for international terrorism in the Middle East. There are three perfect examples. In fact, the only three major examples that I know of. However, they aren't candidates. In fact, they are not even in the running. They are not competitive. The examples that are in the running are, for example, cited in the Current History issue, to which I referred, which does discuss 1985 and gives two examples of the evil scourge of terrorism, namely the hijacking of TWA 847, killing one American Navy diver and the hijacking of the Achille Lauro which led to the killing of Leon Klinghoffer, a crippled American -- both surely terrorist atrocities. Those are the two examples that are in the running, that are memorable, that count for international terrorism. Well, the hijackers for the TWA plane claim -- correctly, in fact -- that Israel was regularly hijacking ships in the international waters in transit between Lebanon and Cyprus, killing people and kidnapping others, taking them to Israel, either for interrogation or simply as hostages, keeping them in jail for years. Some people are still in jail without charges but that doesn't justify the hijacking on the assumption, which I accept at least, that violence is not legitimate in retaliation against even worse atrocities or as preemption against future atrocities. Violence is not legitimate in such cases so we can dismiss those claims though they are in fact correct. Incidentally, the U.S.-Israeli hijackings -- and remember, if Israel does it, we are doing it -- those hijackings are also out of the historical records. Occasionally, you find a reference to them in the bottom of a column on something or other but they are not part of the history of terrorism. The hijackers of the Achille Lauro claimed that this was retaliation for the bombing of Tunis a couple of days earlier. Well, we dismiss that with contempt on the same principle, namely, violence is not justified in retaliation or preemption. Assuming that we can rise to the minimal, moral, level that I mentioned earlier -- if we are not confirmed hypocrites, in other words -- then some consequences follow about other acts of retaliation and preemption but that's too obvious to talk about so I will just leave it for you to think about. Well, that's 1985, the peak year of international terrorism in the Middle East.

As a research project, you might see if I have left out anything that is a competitor for the prize that I am not aware of. None are mentioned in the literature on terrorism. As I said at the beginning, you don't really have to work very hard to see these things. You have to work very hard not to see them. It takes a really good education to miss this. Ah, it's a, think about it and see. 1985 was, of course, not the first or the last act of international terrorism in the Middle East. There are many others that are quite important. For example, in 1975, Israel, meaning Israeli pilots with U.S. planes and U.S. support, in December 1975, they bombed a village in Lebanon killing over 50 people. No pretext was offered but everybody knew what the reason was. At that time, the UN Security Council was meeting to consider a resolution which was supported by the entire world with marginal exceptions -- only one crucial exception, the United States, which vetoed the resolution -- calling for a diplomatic settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict, incorporating UN 242 and all of its wording of the main resolution, security and territorial integrity and all those nice things on the internationally recognized border. The offending part of this one was that it also referred to Palestinian national rights and that's not acceptable to the United States. It rejected them then and it rejects them now, contrary to a lot of nonsense that you read. The U.S. vetoed the resolution. That [terminated, didn't terminate] continued, and is still going on in fact year after year of efforts of diplomatic settlement, which the U.S. has unilaterally blocked. Israel does not have a veto at the Security Council so they reacted to the debate by bombing Lebanon and killing about 50 people without a pretext. That's not in the annals of international terrorism either. [There are more, many more recent cases including the two invasions of ... in 1993 and 1996] The U.S. supported both of them, lots of deaths, hundreds of thousands of people driven out and so on. Clinton had to back off his support for the 1996 invasion after the Qana massacre, over a hundred people in a UN refugee camp. At that point he said, "can't handle this any more, you better leave." There was no pretext of self-defense in this case. This is just outright international terrorism or maybe aggression. And it continues.

So let's go up to the current intifada, which broke out on September 30th of year 2000. In the first couple of days, there was no fire from Palestinians, some stone throwing, but Israel was in fact using U.S. attack helicopters to attack civilian apartment complexes and so on, killing and wounding dozens of people in the first few days. The Clinton Administration responded to this by, I'll borrow our President's phrase, by "enhancing terror." You recall President Bush condemned the Palestinians for "enhancing terror" last month, so I'll use his phrase in line with the guidelines. The Clinton Administration committed itself to enhancing terror on October 3rd by making a deal for the biggest shipment in a decade of military helicopters to Israel along with spare parts for the Apache attack helicopters that were sent a couple of weeks earlier. That's enhancing terror. In the days right after, these helicopters were being used to murder and wound civilians, attacking apartment complexes and so on. The press cooperated by refusing to report this. Note: not failing to report it -- refusing to report it. It was specifically brought to the attention of editors and they simply made it clear that they were not going to report it. There is no question about the facts, incidentally, but to this day it has not been reported, except in the margins. That policy continues.

Skip to December 2001 [last month, two months ago]. George Bush was condemning the Palestinians for enhancing terror and he contributed in the conventional ways to enhancing terror, in crucial ways, in fact. On December 15th, the UN Security Council debated a European-initiated resolution, calling on both sides to reduce violence and calling for the introduction of international monitors to assist in monitoring a reduction of violence. That's a very important step. That was vetoed by the United States. [... who wanted to enhance violence evidently] It's hard to think of any other interpretation for this. The press didn't have to bother giving an interpretation because it was barely reported. It then went to the General Assembly where it wasn't reported at all and there was an overwhelming vote supporting the same resolution. This time, the United States and Israel were not entirely isolated in opposition as several Pacific Islands joined in -- Nauru and one or two others. So, therefore, not the usual splendid isolation. I don't recall that that was reported. About ten days before that there was another major contribution to enhancing terror. The Fourth Geneva Conventions, according to the entire world, literally, outside of Israel, applied to the occupied territories. The United States refuses, it doesn't vote against this when it comes up in the United Nations, it abstains. I presume the reason is the United States doesn't want to take such an open blatant stand in violation of fundamental principles of international law, particularly because of the circumstances under which they were enacted.

If you recall, the Geneva Conventions were established right after the Second World War in order to criminalize the acts of the Nazis, so saying they don't apply is a pretty strong statement. However, outside of the United States and Israel, the whole world agrees. The International Red Cross, which is the agency responsible for applying and interpreting them, agrees. In fact, as far as I am aware, there is no further question about this. Switzerland, which is the responsible state, called a meeting of the High Contracting Parties for the Geneva conventions -- that is, those like the United States that are legally obligated by treaty to enforce them, a high solemn commitment -- called a meeting on December 5th in Geneva and the meeting took place and passed a strong resolution determining that the Geneva conventions do apply to the occupied territories which makes illegal just about everything that the United States and Israel do there. They went through the list -- settlements, displacements and everything that goes on. The United States boycotted the session. They got another country to boycott them, Australia. According to the Australian press, under heavy U.S. pressure, Australia joined in boycotting them. If the U.S. boycotts it, it's like a negative vote at the Security Council or the General Assembly. It doesn't get reported and it's out of history. But that's another important step to enhancing terror. All this took place, incidentally, in the midst of a twenty-one day truce, a one-sided truce. The Palestinians weren't carrying out any acts but a couple of dozen Palestinians were killed, including a dozen children. That was right in the middle of these efforts to enhance terror [took place]... Maybe that's an unfair interpretation and there is some other motive that I'm not thinking of but that's what they look like to me. You can think about that.

In any event, international terrorism in the Middle East certainly continues and has a long history and if you look over the record, of course, it is mixed and complicated but I think you will find that the balance is pretty much along the lines that I described, in fact, the balance reflects the means of violence available, as it usually does. If you look around at terror, in fact, that's why, in the whole range of terror, state terror is far worse than individual terror for the obvious reason that states have means of violence that individuals don't have, or groups. And that's what you find if you look, I think, overwhelmingly. It is commonly said that terrorism is a weapon of the weak. That's completely false, at least if you accept the official U.S. definition of terror. If you do that, then terror is overwhelming the weapon of the strong, like most other weapons. Well, that's history but all of this stuff is out of history. History is what is created by well-educated intellectuals and it doesn't have to have any resemblance to that thing called "history" by naive people and I think if you check this, you will find this true.

Well, that's the Middle East. Let's turn to Central America, the other main focus of the plague by depraved opponents of civilization itself. Here, I will be brief because the core parts are uncontroversial, at least, uncontroversial among people who have minimal regard for international law and international institutions and so on. Actually, the size of that category is very easily estimated, namely, ask yourself how often what I'm about to say has appeared in the discussions about the evil plague of terrorism in the past five months. Huge flood, but how much has been devoted to some uncontroversial cases, again, uncontroversial if you think the World Court and Security Council and international law have some significance. Well, in 1986, the International Court of Justice condemned the United States for international terrorism -- "unlawful use of force" -- in its war against Nicaragua. Again I am going to keep to the guidelines, bend over backwards, and allow this to be interpreted just as international terrorism, not the war crime of aggression. So we will call it "international terrorism." The court ordered the United States to terminate the crimes and to pay substantial reparations, millions of dollars. Congress reacted by instantly escalating the war by new funding to escalate the war. Nicaragua took the matter to the Security Council, which debated a resolution calling on all states to observe international law, mentioning no one but everyone knew who was meant. The U.S. vetoed it. Nicaragua then went to the General Assembly which passed similar resolutions in successive years. The United States and Israel opposed and in one year they got El Salvador [to join them].

All of this is out of history. It has to be. It is just inconsistent with their preferred image of what history is supposed to be and, as I say, you can check how much [these have been] these are uncontroversial cases [you can check and see how much] have been referred to recently. And remember who were the individuals responsible: people like Negroponte, proconsul of Honduras, Rumsfeld, special envoy to the Middle East, and so on, plenty of continuity. Well, The U.S. reacted, as I said, by escalating the war and also for the first time giving official orders to its mercenary forces to attack what are called "soft targets." That's what the Southern Command called them, "soft targets," meaning undefended civilian targets like agricultural cooperatives and so on. That was known and it was discussed in the United States. It was considered legitimate by the "Left," so Michael Kinsley who represents the "Left" in the mainstream debate, in an interesting article -- he was then editor of the New Republic -- in which he said that, we shouldn't be too quick to condemn State Department authorization for attacks on undefended civilian targets because we have to apply pragmatic criteria. We have to carry out "cost benefit analysis" and see whether, as he put it, the amount of blood poured in is compensated by a good outcome, namely, democracy. What we will determine to be democracy and what that means you can see by looking at the states next door like El Salvador and Guatemala which were okay democracies. And if it passes our test, then that's it, okay. So, in other words, international terrorism is fine -- assuming it meets pragmatic criteria, now across the spectrum, Left or Right among "we" -- that is educated and privileged intellectuals, not the [general] population, of course.

In Nicaragua, the population had an army to defend it -- it was bad enough, tens of thousands of people killed, the country practically devastated, may never recover -- but it had an army to defend it. In El Salvador and Guatemala, that wasn't true, the army was the state terrorists. The U.S.-supported state terrorists, they were the army. There was no one to defend the population and, in fact, the atrocities were far worse. Also, they are not a state so they could not go to the World Court or the Security Council to follow legal means -- of course, without any effect, because "we," people like us, have determined that the world is going to be ruled by force, not by law. And since we have the power, as long as we determine that, a state that tries to follow legitimate means of responding to international terrorism doesn't having anything to do. But that's our choice, nobody else's choice. You can't blame anyone else on that. There was, however, enough popular resistance, not elite resistance, but popular resistance to the atrocities there so that the U.S. had to resort to an international terrorist network -- an extraordinary international terrorist network.

Remember, the U.S. is a powerful state, it's not like Libya. If Libya wants to carry out terrorist acts, they hire Carlos the Jackal or something. The United States hires terrorist states, we're big guys. So the terrorist network consisted of Taiwan, Britain, Israel, Argentina -- at least, as long as it was under the rule of the neo-Nazi generals, when they were unfortunately removed, they fell out of the system -- Saudi Arabian funding, quite a substantial international terrorist network, never been anything like it. In contemporary terms, we might call it an "Axis of Evil," I suppose. The outcome -- again keeping to the guidelines: we believe our leaders -- the result was hundreds of thousands of people slaughtered and millions of orphans and refugees, every conceivable atrocity, the region devastated. The single uncontroversial case, Nicaragua, which was the least of them, that alone far surpasses the crimes of September 11th -- and the others suffered far worse. This is, again we are bending over backwards and giving the U.S. the benefit of the doubt so we are only calling it international terrorism organized by depraved opponents of civilization itself. Well, that's the second major area, Central America.

All of this, however, is off the record, too. [In] the Current History journal -- and it's typical in this respect -- nothing that I have just referred to is mentioned. Nor is it in the whole scholarly literature, in fact, except way out at the margins. You can check and see it just doesn't count. The '80s are described as the era of state-sponsored international terrorism but they are not referring to any of these things. The U.S. was trying to prevent state-sponsored international terrorism by taking "pro-active" means like the most massive international terrorist network that's ever been known. That's very typical of the scholarly literature, journalism and, again, you can do a check. There has barely been a word on any of this as the second phase of the war on terrorism has been declared once again with pretty much the same people and every reason to expect some more [similar] outcomes.

Well, let's continue, from all of this an obvious conclusion follows: there is an operational definition of terrorism, the one that is actually used -- it means terror that they carry out against us -- that's terrorism, and nothing else passes through the filter. Furthermore, as far as I know, that's a historical universal, I can't find an exception to that. You might try. So for example, the Japanese in China and Manchuria [claimed they] were "defending" the population against Chinese terrorists and going to create an earthly paradise for them if they could control the terrorists. The Nazis in occupied Europe [claimed they] were "defending" the "legitimate" governments like Vichy and the population from the terrorist partisans who were supported from abroad, as indeed they were. They were run from London, Poland and France and so on. The fact as I said I can't find an exception, you might try. Also, as far as I am aware, this is virtually universal among intellectuals, educated folks like us. Apart from statistical error, this is the line that they take. Now, it doesn't look that way in history, but you have to remember who writes history.

That ought to leave you with a little skepticism. If you look at actual history, not the one that's written, I think you will find that this is the case and I could even maybe suggest it as a research topic to some enterprising graduate student who aspires to a career as a taxi driver. Well, Just to continue to the present, let's just take the last couple of months. September 11th was a perfectly clear example of international terrorism, no controversy about that so we don't have to waste time on it. What about the reaction? Well, it turns out the reaction is also an uncontroversial case of international terrorism. Again, let's keep to the guidelines -- we'll just listen to what our leaders say. So, on October 11th, President Bush announced to the Afghan people that we will keep bombing you until you hand over people who we suspect of terrorist acts although we refuse to provide any evidence and we refuse to enter into any negotiations for extradition and transfer -- a clear case of international terrorism.

On October 28th, the British counterpart, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, who is the chief of the British defense staff, took it a step further. Remember, getting rid of the Taliban regime was not a war aim -- that was an afterthought. Three weeks after the bombing began, that [aim] was added, presumably so that intellectuals would have something to feel good about or something, I don't know. Anyway, three weeks after the bombing, that was added as a new war aim and Admiral Boyce announced to the Afghan people accordingly, I think this was the first mention of this war aim, that we will continue bombing you until you change your leadership. First, that was all very prominent, page one of the New York Times in both cases. Two, both cases are textbook illustrations of international terrorism, if not aggression, but we are still bending over backwards, and it's all off the record by usual convention. We're doing it so it doesn't count. It's only when "they" carry out what we officially define as "terrorism" that it counts.

Well, it's easy to go on but let me just return to the weak thesis: there can't be a war against terrorism, at least against, as terrorism is defined in official U.S. documents, it's a logical impossibility. This is a small sample of illustrations -- you can go on easily -- but it's enough to show that that can't be true. Well, that's the weak thesis. What about the strong thesis, that it is all so entirely obvious that it would be embarrassing to talk about it because it's all right on the surface, nothing hidden about any of this? Everything that I mention is perfectly well known, you don't have to penetrate anything to discover it. No obscure sources, nothing, just the obvious evidence. And you can easily add to it, there's a ton of literature about it for the last twenty years but that literature also can't be discussed because it comes out with the wrong conclusion. So it's treated the same way terrorism is in our intellectual culture. Again, choice, not a necessity. So we end up with a kind of dilemma. If we are not honest, forget it. If we are honest, there's a dilemma. One possibility is just to acknowledge that we are total hypocrites and then to at least have the decency to stop talking about things like human rights, right and wrong and good and evil and so on and say "we are hypocrites and we have force and we are going to run the world by force, period. Let's forget about everything else." The other option is harder to pursue but it's imperative. Unless we would like to contribute to still worse disasters that are likely to lie ahead.

Friday, May 29, 2009

UCTV: Noam Chomsky

Conversations with History: Noam Chomsky


(Transcript is still under revision)

Welcome to a Conversation with History. I'm Harry Kreisler of the Institute of International Studies. Our guest today is Noam Chomsky.

BACKGROUND

Noam, welcome to Berkeley. Where were you born and raised?

I was born in Philadelphia, in 1928. I stayed there until I went through undergraduate school at the University of Pennsylvania, then went on to Harvard for a couple of a years in a research fellowship, and graduate school. When I was done with that, went over to MIT, and I've been in Boston ever since, around Boston since about 1950.

Your parents both were Hebrew grammarians and taught Hebrew school?

My father was, professionally, a Hebrew scholar, and worked with Hebrew grammar. And my mother was a Hebrew teacher. My father sort of ran the Hebrew school system in the city of Philadelphia, and my mother taught in it. He taught in Hebrew College later. There's a Graduate University of Jewish Studies, Dropsie College, which he taught in. But they were all part of what amounted to kind of a Hebrew ghetto, Jewish ghetto in Philadelphia -- not a physical ghetto, it was scattered around the city, but cultural ghetto.

Was Hebrew the language spoken at home?

No, it was in the background. So, for example, by the time I was, eight or nine, on Friday evenings my father and I would read Hebrew literature together.

How do you think your parents shaped your perspectives on the world?

Those are always very hard questions, because it's a combination of influence and resistance, which is difficult to sort out. Undoubtedly, the background shaped the kinds of interests and tendencies and directions that I pursued. But it was independent. More direct influences actually came from other parts of the family. My parents were immigrants, and they happened to end up in Philadelphia, but my mother from New York and my father from Baltimore. When he came over in 1913, for whatever reason, his family went to Baltimore, and my mother's family from another part of the pale of settlement came to New York. And they were two different families -- there was the New York family and the Baltimore family, and we were in the middle in Philadelphia, so we naturally went up and back; they were close by.

The families were totally different. The Baltimore family was ultra-orthodox. In fact, my father told me that they had become more orthodox when they got here than they even were in the shtetl (town) in the Ukraine where they came from. In general, there was a tendency among some sectors of immigrants to intensify the cultural tradition, probably as a way of identifying themselves in a strange environment, I suppose. So that was that family.

The other part of the family, my mother's, was mainly Jewish working class -- very radical. The Jewish element had disappeared. This is 1930s, so they were part of the ferment of radical activism that was going on in the thirties in all sorts of ways. Of all of them, the one that actually did influence me a great deal was an uncle -- an uncle by marriage; he married my aunt -- who was an extremely interesting person. He came into the family when I was about seven or eight and became a big influence. He had grown up in New York, also from an immigrant family. But he had grown up in a poor area of New York. In fact, he himself never went past fourth grade -- on the streets, you know, and this criminal background, and all [the things that were] going on in the underclass ghettos in New York. He happened to have a physical deformity, so he was able to get a newsstand under a compensation program that was run in the 1930s for people with disabilities. He had a newsstand on 72nd Street in New York; lived nearby in a little apartment. I spent a lot of time there.

That newsstand became an intellectual center for émigrés from Europe, lots of Germans and other émigrés were coming. He wasn't a very educated person, formally; like I said, he never went past fourth grade, but maybe the most educated person I've ever met. Self-educated. Without going through the whole story, he ended up being a lay analyst in a Riverside Drive apartment in New York. But the newsstand itself was a very lively, intellectual center -- professors of this and that arguing all night. And working at the newsstand was a lot of fun.

So the newspapers and events of the world, mixed up with ideas. Almost like a coffee house without the coffee, I guess.

Yes, the newspapers were kind of like an artifact. So, for example, I went for years thinking that there's a newspaper called Newsinmira. And the reason is, as people came out of the subway station and raced passed the newsstand, they would say "Newsinmira," what I heard that way, and I gave them two tabloids, which I later discovered were the News and the Mirror. And I noticed that as soon as they picked up the "Newsinmira," the first thing they opened to was the sports page. So this is an eight-year-old picture of the world. There were newspapers there, but that wasn't all there was -- that was kind of like the background of the discussions that were going on.

Through him and through other influences, I got myself involved in the ongoing thirties radicalism, and was very much part of the Hebrew-based, Zionist-oriented -- this is Palestine, pre-Israel -- Palestine-oriented life. And that was a good part of my life. I became a Hebrew teacher myself, a Zionist youth leader, combining it with the radical activism in various ways. Actually, that's the way I got into linguistics.

Formative influences, as I understand it, in this period for you, are reading George Orwell, and also, in terms of events, the Depression and the Spanish Civil War. Tell us a little about that.

It came the other way. Orwell's great book, in my opinion, his greatest book, Homage to Catalonia, I think was first published in 1937, but it was suppressed -- a couple hundred copies published, both in England and the United States; it was essentially suppressed. The reason was it was very anticommunist, and in those days that didn't sell. During the Second World War, it was totally suppressed because you couldn't [criticize] "Uncle Joe." So it didn't sell, what he was doing. His book finally reached the public -- this is from memory, so maybe the dates are wrong -- but I think it was around 1947 or '48, with an introduction by Lionel Trilling, and it was presented as a Cold War document at that time. I mean, Orwell, who had died already, would have hated it. And that's when I found Homage to Catalonia. But I had been interested in the Spanish Civil War long before.

You actually wrote, your first essay was as a ten-year-old ...

... On the Spanish Civil War.

What did you say then, and what do you think now about how that event and your response to it influenced you?

Well, the article was ... you know, like you said, I was ten years old. I'm sure I would not want to read it today. I remember what it was about because I remember what struck me. This was right after the fall of Barcelona, the Fascist forces had conquered Barcelona, and that was essentially the end of the Spanish Civil War. And the article was about the spread of fascism around Europe. So it started off by talking about Munich and Barcelona, and the spread of the Nazi power, fascist power, which was extremely frightening.

Just to add a little word of personal background, we happened to be, for most of my childhood, the only Jewish family in a mostly Irish and German Catholic neighborhood, sort of a lower middle-class neighborhood, which was very anti-Semitic, and quite pro-Nazi. It's obvious why the Irish would be: they hated the British; it's not surprising the Germans were [anti-Semitic]. I can remember beer parties when Paris fell. And the sense of the threat of this black cloud spreading over Europe was very frightening. I could pick up my mother's attitudes, particularly; she was terrified by it.

It was also in my personal life, because I saw the streets. Interesting; for some reason which I do not understand to this day, my brother and I never talked to our parents about it. I don't think they knew that we were living in an anti-Semitic neighborhood. But on the streets, you know, you go out and play ball with kids, or try to walk to the bus or something, it was a constant threat. It was just the kind of thing you didn't talk to your parents about, and knew for some reason, you didn't talk to them. To the day of their death they didn't know. But there was this combination of the knowing that this cloud was spreading over the world, and picking up, particularly, my mother's attitudes, very upset about it -- my father too, but more constrained -- and knowing from the uncles and aunts some of the background, and living it in the streets in my own daily life, that made it very real.

Anyhow, by the late thirties, I did become quite interested in Spanish anarchism and the Spanish Civil War, where all of this was being fought out at the time. It was right before the World War broke out, but a kind of microcosm was going on in Spain. By the time I was old enough to get on a train by myself, like around ten or eleven, I would go to New York for a weekend and stay with my aunt and uncle, and hang around at anarchist bookstores down around Union Square and Fourth Avenue, There were little bookstores with émigrés, really interesting people. To my mind they looked about ninety; they were maybe in their forties or something, who were very interested in young people. They wanted young people to come along, so they spent a lot of attention. Talking to these people was a real education.

And out of that, when I wrote the article, it was with that background. It was long before I heard of Orwell.

ANARCHISM AND POWER (12:35)

These experiences we've described, you were saying they led you into linguistics, but also led you into your view of politics and of the world. You're a libertarian anarchist, and when one hears that, because of the way issues are framed in this country, there's often many misperceptions -- and also because of things that you've written. Help us understand what that means. In other words, it doesn't mean that you favor chaos or no government, necessarily.

The United States is sort of out of the world on this topic. Britain is to a limited extent, but the United States is like on Mars. So here, the term "libertarian" means the opposite of what it always meant in history. Libertarian throughout modern European history meant socialist anarchist. It meant the anti-state element of the Workers Movement and the Socialist Movement. It sort of broke into two branches, roughly, one statist, one anti-statist. The statist branch led to Bolshevism and Lenin and Trotsky, and so on. The anti-statist branch, which included Marxists, Left Marxists -- Rosa Luxemburg and others -- kind of merged, more or less, into an amalgam with a big strain of anarchism into what was called "libertarian socialism." So libertarian in Europe always meant socialist. Here it means ultra-conservative -- Ayn Rand or Cato Institute or something like that. But that's a special U.S. usage. There are a lot of things quite special about the way the United States developed, and this is part of it. There [in Europe] it meant, and always meant to me, socialist and anti-state, an anti-state branch of socialism, which meant a highly organized society, completely organized and nothing to do with chaos, but based on democracy all the way through. That means democratic control of communities, of workplaces, of federal structures, built on systems of voluntary association, spreading internationally. That's traditional anarchism. You know, anybody can have the word if they like, but that's the mainstream of traditional anarchism.

And it has roots. Coming back to the United States, it has very strong roots in the American working class movements. So if you go back to, say, the 1850s, the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, right around the area where I live, in Eastern Massachusetts, in the textile plants and so on, the people working on those plants were, in part, young women coming off the farm. They were called "factory girls," the women from the farms who worked in the textile plants. Some of them were Irish, immigrants in Boston and that group of people. They had an extremely rich and interesting culture. They're kind of like my uncle who never went past fourth grade -- very educated, reading modern literature. They didn't bother with European radicalism, that had no effect on them, but the general literary culture, they were very much a part of. And they developed their own conceptions of how the world ought to be organized.

They had their own newspapers. In fact, the period of the freest press in the United States was probably around the 1850s. In the 1850s, the scale of the popular press, meaning run by the factory girls in Lowell and so on, was on the scale of the commercial press or even greater. These were independent newspapers -- a lot of interesting scholarship on them, if you can read them now. They [arose] spontaneously, without any background. [The writers had] never heard of Marx or Bakunin or anyone else; they developed the same ideas. From their point of view, what they called "wage slavery," renting yourself to an owner, was not very different from the chattel slavery that they were fighting a civil war about. You have to recall that in the mid-nineteenth century, that was a common view in the United States -- for example, the position of the Republican Party, Abraham Lincoln's position. It's not an odd view, that there isn't much difference between selling yourself and renting yourself. So the idea of renting yourself, meaning working for wages, was degrading. It was an attack on your personal integrity. They despised the industrial system that was developing, that was destroying their culture, destroying their independence, their individuality, constraining them to be subordinate to masters.

There was a tradition of what was called Republicanism in the United States. We're free people, you know, the first free people in the world. This was destroying and undermining that freedom. This was the core of the labor movement all over, and included in it was the assumption, just taken for granted, that "those who work in the mills should own them." In fact, one of the their main slogans, I'll just quote it, was they condemned what they called the "new spirit of the age: gain wealth, forgetting all but self." That new spirit, that you should only be interested in gaining wealth and forgetting about your relations to other people, they regarded it as a violation of fundamental human nature, and a degrading idea.

That was a strong, rich American culture, which was crushed by violence. The United States has a very violent labor history, much more so than Europe. It was wiped out over a long period, with extreme violence. By the time it picked up again in the 1930s, that's when I personally came into the tail end of it. After the Second World War it was crushed. By now, it's forgotten. But it's very real. I don't really think it's forgotten, I think it's just below the surface in people's consciousness.

This is a continuing problem, and something that emerges in your scientific work, also, namely, the extent to which histories and traditions are forgotten. To define a new position often means going back and finding those older traditions.

Things like this, they're forgotten in the intellectual culture, but my feeling is they're probably alive in the popular culture, in people's sentiments and attitudes and understanding and so on. I know when I talk to, say, working-class audiences today, and I talk about these ideas, they seem very natural to them. I mean, it's true, nobody talks about them, but when you bring it up, the idea that you have to rent yourself to somebody and follow their orders, and that they own and you work there, and you built it but you don't own it, that's a highly unnatural notion. You don't have to study any complicated theories to see that this is an attack on human dignity.

So coming out of this tradition, being influenced by and continue to believe in it, what is your notion of legitimate power? Under what circumstances is power legitimate?

The core of the anarchist tradition, as I understand it, is that power is always illegitimate, unless it proves itself to be legitimate. So the burden of proof is always on those who claim that some authoritarian hierarchic relation is legitimate. If they can't prove it, then it should be dismantled.

Can you ever prove it? Well, it's a heavy burden of proof to bear, but I think sometimes you can bear it. So to take a homely example, if I'm walking down the street with my four-year-old granddaughter, and she starts to run into the street, and I grab her arm and pull her back, that's an exercise of power and authority, but I can give a justification for it, and it's obvious what the justification would be. And maybe there are other cases where you can justify it. But the question that always should be asked uppermost in our mind is, "Why should I accept it?" It's the responsibility of those who exercise power to show that somehow it's legitimate. It's not the responsibility of anyone else to show that it's illegitimate. It's illegitimate by assumption, if it's a relation of authority among human beings which places some above others. That's illegitimate by assumption. Unless you can give a strong argument to show that it's right, you've lost.

It's kind of like the use of violence, say, in international affairs. There's a very heavy burden of proof to be borne by anyone who calls for violence. Maybe it can be sometimes justified. Personally, I'm not a committed pacifist, so I think that, yes, it can sometimes be justified. So I thought, in fact, in that article I wrote in fourth grade, I thought the West should be using force to try to stop fascism, and I still think so. But now I know a lot more about it. I know that the West was actually supporting fascism, supporting Franco, supporting Mussolini, and so on, and even Hitler. I didn't know that at the time. But I thought then and I think now that the use of force to stop that plague would have been legitimate, and finally was legitimate. But an argument has to be given for it.

Is there less of a burden of proof when you're looking at weaker power entities, looking at the powerless, basically? Is the burden of proof less for them?

No, it's the same. When you take, say, people living under military occupation or under racist regimes and so on, they have a right to resist. Actually, everyone in the world except the United States and Israel believes they have a right to exist, if you look at the UN resolutions.

You're talking about Palestine now.

Palestine, or South Africa. If you take a look, there are major UN resolutions on terrorism, in 1987 denouncing the plague of international terrorism, and calling on everyone to do something to stop it. It passed with two negative votes, the United States and Israel. The reason was exactly this, they explained it: it said "nothing in this resolution will prejudice the right of people to struggle for independence against racist and colonialist regimes and foreign military occupation." That meant South Africa and Israel, so, therefore, the United States objected because it is opposed, it does not grant the right of people to struggle against racist and colonialist regimes and foreign occupation. U.S. and Israel are alone on that. When the U.S. votes against a resolution, it's out of history, so you don't read about it, but it's there. The war against terrorism isn't new, it's old. The U.S. is alone in opposing it.

Now, I believe that the world is right on this and that the U.S. is wrong. There is a right to resist racist and colonialist regimes and foreign military occupation. But then comes your question: Is there a right to use violence to do that? Well, no, I think the burden of proof is on those who say there is a right to use violence. And that's a hard burden to meet, both morally and even tactically. And, frankly, I think it can very rarely be met.

THINKING ABOUT POWER (24:55)

I've read interviews where you have tried to separate your approach in science to your approach of politics. How does your approach to the world as a scientist affect and influence the way you approach politics?

I think studying science is a good way to get into fields like history. The reason is, you learn what an argument means, you learn what evidence is, you learn what makes sense to postulate and when, what's going to be convincing. You internalize the modes of rational inquiry, which happen to be much more advanced in the sciences than anywhere else. On the other hand, applying relativity theory to history isn't going to get you anywhere. So it's a mode of thinking. I try, at least -- with what success; others have to judge -- to [apply] the mode of thinking that you would use in the sciences to human affairs.

As to other connections, there may be some, but they're pretty remote. If you think about the core notions of what I was calling anarchism, which, as I say, is deeply rooted in popular traditions everywhere (for good reasons), if you try to take it apart, it's based on a conception of what Bakunin once called "an instinct for freedom," that people have an instinctive drive for freedom from domination and control. I can't prove it, but I think that's probably true.

The core of the work that I've been interested in, in language, is also interested in a kind of human freedom: the cognitive capacity to create indefinitely, and its roots in our nature. Historically, people have drawn a connection between these. If you look at, say, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the Romantic periods, this connection was explicitly drawn. If you read Rousseau or Wilhelm von Humboldt and others, the connection between human freedom in the social and political realm and human freedom in the creative use of cognitive capacity, in particular language, they did try to establish a connection.

Now, if you ask, can this be connected at the level of science, the answer is no. It's a parallel intuition, which doesn't link up empirically, but maybe could someday if we knew enough.

You said somewhere, I think in this new book on power, "You can lie or distort the story of the French Revolution as long as you like and nothing will happen. Propose a false theory in chemistry and it will be refuted tomorrow."

Yes, that's the kind of thing I mean. Nature is tough. You can't fiddle with Mother Nature, she's a hard taskmistress. So you're forced to be honest in the natural sciences. In the soft fields, you're not forced to be honest. There are standards, of course; on the other hand, they're very weak. If what you propose is ideologically acceptable, that is, supportive of power systems, you can get away with a huge amount. In fact, the difference between the conditions that are imposed on dissident opinion and on mainstream opinion are radically different. I'll give you a concrete example, if you like.

Yes, do that.

Okay. For example, I've written about terrorism, and I think you can show without much difficulty that terrorism pretty much corresponds to power. I don't think that's very surprising. The more powerful states are involved in more terrorism, by and large. The United States is the most powerful, so it's involved in massive terrorism, by its own definition of terrorism. Well, if I want to establish that, I'm required to give a huge amount of evidence. I think that's a good thing. I don't object to that. I think anyone who makes that claim should be held to very high standards. So extensive documentation, and from the internal secret records and historical record and so on. And if you ever find a comma misplaced, somebody ought to criticize you for it. So I think those standards are fine.

All right, now, let's suppose that you play the mainstream game. For example, the Yale University Press just came out with a volume called The Age of Terror. The contributors are leading historians, many of them at Yale, the top people in the field. You read the book The Age of Terror, the first thing you notice is there isn't a single footnote, there isn't a single reference. There are just off-the-top-of-your-head statements. Some of the statements are tenable, some are untenable, but there are no intellectual criteria imposed. The reviews of the book are very favorable, laudatory, and maybe it's right, maybe it's wrong. I happen to think a lot of it is wrong and demonstrably wrong. But doesn't really matter, you can say anything you want because you support power, and nobody expects you to justify anything. For example, on the unimaginable circumstance that I was on, say, Nightline, and I was asked, say, "Do you think Kadhafi is a terrorist?" I could say, "Yeah, Kadhafi is a terrorist." I don't need any evidence. Suppose I said, "George Bush is a terrorist." Well, then I would be expected to provide evidence, "Why would you say that?"

So that you aren't cut off right there.

In fact, the structure of the news production system is, you can't produce evidence. There's even a name for it -- I learned it from the producer of Nightline, Jeff Greenfield. It's called "concision." He was asked in an interview somewhere why they didn't have me on Nightline, and his answer was -- two answers. First of all, he says, "Well, he talks Turkish, and nobody understands it." But the other answer was, "He lacks concision." Which is correct, I agree with him. The kinds of things that I would say on Nightline, you can't say in one sentence because they depart from standard religion. If you want to repeat the religion, you can get away with it between two commercials. If you want to say something that questions the religion, you're expected to give evidence, and that you can't do between two commercials. So therefore you lack concision, so therefore you can't talk.

I think that's a terrific technique of propaganda. To impose concision is a way of virtually guaranteeing that the party line gets repeated over and over again, and that nothing else is heard.

This is why so much of your work in the area of politics has been focused on what you call "manufacturing consent," meaning the framing of issues, the way topics are put off the table for discussion. So in the end, what your work suggests is that in coming to understand that, then there's hope for understanding the problems we confront.

Oh, yes. Actually, I should say, the term "manufacturing consent" is not mine, I took it from Walter Lippmann, the leading public intellectual and leading media figure of the twentieth century, who thought it was a great idea. He said we should manufacture consent, that's the way democracies should work. There should be a small group of powerful people, and the rest of the population should be spectators, and you should force them to consent by controlling, regimenting their minds. That's the leading idea of democratic theorists, and the public relations industry and so on, so I'm not making it up. In fact, I'm just borrowing their conception, and telling other people what they think. But, yes, that's very important, and, yes, there is hope, I think. Ordinary common sense suffices, no special training, like my uncle, to unravel this and see what's really happening. I don't think it's hard to discover that the U.S. is a leading terrorist state; in fact, it's obvious.

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE WORLD (33:54)

When one reads your arguments, what you're laying out is fairly simple, namely, if I can paraphrase, that if you're suddenly calling a Iraq a rogue state in the nineties, well, what were you calling it in the eighties, and were they doing the same thing, and at that time, were you helping them do it? And this is your critique of U.S. foreign policy.

If George Bush tells us, like he did last week, and Tony Blair tells us, in this case, that "We can't let Saddam Hussein survive because he's the most evil man in history, he even used chemical weapons against his own people," I agree that far. But it gives hypocrisy a bad name to stop there. You have to add, "Yes, he used chemical weapons against his own people, with the support of Daddy Bush, who continued to support him right past that, knowing what he was doing; who helped him develop weapons of mass destruction. Welcomed him as a friend and ally, gave him lavish aid, after all these crimes."Unless you add that, it's just, like I say, giving hypocrisy a bad name. Well, nobody says that. You can read the commentary and the learned opinion and leading figures, and they just stop, "He used chemical weapons against his own people."

Now, this is not difficult to understand, I think you can explain this to children in school. It takes major efforts for the educated classes to prevent people from knowing these things. That takes dedication. It would be a lot easier to tell the truth. This is one example. It's a characteristic example.

In the late 1990s there was a huge chorus of self-adulation in the West about how we're entering a new age of history, in which the enlightened states are bringing humanitarian ideals to the world, for the first time in history, following principles and values. And the proof of it is we're bombing Serbia. Okay? Well, at the very same moment, the same people were actively supporting terrorist atrocities which went way beyond anything charged to Milosevic in Kosovo. In fact, I just happened to come back from the site of one of them, southeastern Turkey, where massive atrocities were going on.

Where the Turkish government is committing atrocities against the Kurdish people.

Yes, that's true, but the way I would put it is the U.S. government is committing atrocities ...

By providing aid ...

By providing virtually 80 percent of the arms, in an increasing flow as atrocities increased; providing support, blocking criticism. The press is helping by not reporting it. And, in fact, even more amazingly, Turkey is praised here as a model for opposing terrorism, namely by carrying out some of the worst terrorist atrocities of the late 1990s with our assistance. Well, you know, that's an impressive contribution of the educated culture. It takes effort to do this sort of thing. And it's not hard to explain; in fact, I could explain it in two minutes, and even give you the documentation if you want.

If we were the Council of Foreign Relations, which we're not, the argument would be made, "Well, Turkey has to fit into a larger strategic view of the world, in which they are a modernizing secular state with an Islamic population." What would your answer be to that?

So, therefore, we should help them drive two to three million out of their homes, destroy thousands of villages, and kill 50,000 people ... ?

No, I won't go there. Yeah ...

Well, that's the question. In fact, I think we're harming Turkey by doing this. We're supporting the most reactionary strains in Turkey. Like I say, I was just there, talking about these things. Popular support for opposing the military-run regime is overwhelming. We're supporting the military-run regime. We're preventing its modernization and development. In fact, that's happening throughout much of the world. But even if it were true that we were helping modernization, that in no sense justifies participation in some of the worst acts of terror or worse. I don't know if it is worse; parallel -- praising them as a model for countering terror by carrying out massive terror.

You can generalize this. It only takes, say, to go somewhere else: Indonesia. When Indonesia was following an independent path in the 1950s and the early sixties, the U.S. strongly opposed, actually tried to break up Indonesia in 1958. Finally, a military coup took place with the assistance of the United States in 1965. The coup massacred a couple hundred thousand ... maybe a million people, nobody knows -- mostly landless peasants. It was greeted here with complete unconstrained euphoria. It was described accurately. So The New York Times: "a staggering blood bath." Time magazine: "boiling blood bath." And praise. It was praised because what they called the Indonesian moderates, namely, the ones who carried out the massacre, were turning the country into a U.S. client state. Well, up and from then, '65 till '98, the Indonesian leader, Suharto, one of the worst -- kind of like Saddam Hussein, one of the worst criminals of the modern age -- was lavishly praised and supported as a wonderful person. The Clinton administration called him, "Our kind of guy," because he was serving U.S. interests, while carrying out huge massacres and compiling one of the worst records of atrocities in the world.

What happened to that in history? Well, you know, it's history, but it's not what you teach people in high school, as you should in a free country. That's the task of the intellectuals: be careful to be sure that nobody understands what's going on. That's a major task.

You believe that there are two kinds of intellectuals -- one, the kinds who serve power and are rewarded, and the others are those who stand outside, who basically call a spade a spade.

Yes, we all agree with that when we're talking about enemies. So when we're talking about the Soviet Union, we all agree that there was a difference between the commissars and the dissidents. The commissars were the guys inside who were propagating state propaganda, and the dissidents were a very small group on the fringe, who were trying to call a spade a spade. And we honor the dissidents and we condemn the commissars.

Because they were doing it among our adversaries.

Yes. When we turn around at home, it's the opposite: we honor the commissars and we condemn the dissidents. And furthermore, this goes right through history. Go back to classical Greece and the Bible. Who drank the hemlock in classical Greece? Was it a commissar or a dissident? When we you go to, say, the Bible, you read the biblical record, there are people called prophets. Prophet just means intellectual. They were people giving geopolitical analysis, moral lessons, that sort of thing. We call them intellectuals today. There were the people we honor as prophets, there were the people we condemn as false prophets. But if you look at the biblical record, at the time, it was the other way around. The flatterers of the Court of King Ahab were the ones who were honored. The ones we call prophets were driven into the desert and imprisoned. Yeah, that's the way it's been throughout history. And, understandably. Power does not like to be undermined.

An important point here that I want to bring out is you're comparing our acting against Serbia at a time when we were not doing anything about East Timor, Indonesia, or a number of other places ...

Well, it's not that we're not doing anything ...

Well, we're doing the wrong thing.

We're doing something about it: we're intensifying the atrocities.

But the really interesting thing is that part of the self-deception which is created by the media. We forget what we're doing in one place, where it would be very easy to do something about it, namely stopping the military aid; whereas, in other areas, for example, Serbia, well, if you start bombing, what are the consequences for innocent people?

That's another question. This is independent of what we should have done in Kosovo. You can ask that, but what it does show is that whatever we did, it's not humanitarian. You just take a look at everything else that's going on, and you see that. So what should we have done in Kosovo? Well, here you have to look at the record, and the record is interesting, and it's suppressed by the intellectuals. There's a massive literature about it, and if you look through that literature, you'll notice that something is systematically omitted, namely, the actual record of what was happening. We have a voluminous record from the State Department and from the British Defense System, from NATO, from the UN. As far as I'm aware, there's only one book in print that reviews that record: mine. Of course, the book is condemned because it reviews the record. What the record shows is unequivocal: right up to shortly before the bombing, the British, who were the most hawkish element in the coalition, internally (now it's released, then it was internal) regarded the guerrillas as the main source of atrocities. This is after the Racak [Kosovo] massacre.

This would be the Albanian guerrillas ...

Yes, [the British] said they were the main source of the atrocities. What they were trying to do was to elicit a disproportionate Serbian response, which they did, which would then bring in the West. Now, I don't personally believe that, but that's the British.

We know that right up until the bombing, nothing much changed. It was an ugly place -- I mean, these are not nice guys. The Serbian occupiers were doing vicious things -- not on the level of what we were doing in other places, but bad enough. But nothing changed up till the bombing. When the bombing was undertaken, it was on the expectation that it would elicit atrocities. Not surprising -- we start bombing people, they react. And it did. When you look at the Milosevic's trial, it's for crimes committed after the bombing, and one exception, but ...

The bombing, being by NATO.

By NATO. After the bombing, with an invasion threat, exactly as anticipated, the atrocities mounted and they started expelling the population. Those are crimes, undoubtedly. This guy [Milosevic] is a major criminal. But the crimes happened to be provoked by the NATO bombing. Now what you read is, "Well, we had to bomb to return the Albanians to their homes." Yeah, except that they were driven out of their homes after the bombing. I mean, there were some displaced before, but the huge expulsion and everything was after the bombing. Before that, the West saw it as guerrillas trying to elicit atrocities -- responses and responses. That's the description. You may still decide it was the right thing or the wrong thing, but unless you at least look at the facts, you're not even in the real world.

For example, a fact which we should look at, we can ask, "Was there an alternative to violence? Were there diplomatic alternatives?" Well, you can look back and you see -- in fact, I wrote at the time that it looked like there were diplomatic alternatives. Serbia had a position and NATO had a position. If you actually look at the result after seventy-eight days of bombing, it's a compromise between those two positions. NATO gave up its most extreme demands, the Serbs gave up their most extreme demands, and there was a kind of a compromise. Could that have been reached without the bombing and the atrocities? Well, a good case could be made that it could have been. But, remember, the burden of proof is on those who say you have to bomb. They try to put the burden of proof on others. They can't. It's the ones who use violence who have the burden of proof.

ACTIVISM (46:26)

Not everyone is Noam Chomsky and can produce the extraordinary opus of works on these issues. What is your advice for people who have the same concerns, who identify with the tradition that you come out of, and who want to be active in opposing these policies? What is it they need to be doing that would be productive?

The same as the factory girls in the Lowell textile plant 150 years ago: they joined with others. To do these things alone is extremely hard, especially when you're working fifty hours a week to put the food on the table. Join with others, and you can do a lot of things. It's got a big multiplier effect. That's why unions have always been in the lead of development of social and economic progress. They bring together poor people, working people, enable them to learn from one another, to have their own sources of information, and to act collectively. That's how everything is changed -- the Civil Rights movement, the feminist movement, the solidarity movements, the workers movements. The reason we don't live in a dungeon is because people have joined together to change things. And there's nothing different now from before. In fact, just in the last forty years, we've seen remarkable changes in this respect.

In that sense, in addition to ending the war in Vietnam, the protest movement of the sixties really did change our consciousness.

Totally changed the country.

It changed the behavior of governments, what they had to do to get what they wanted.

Yes. This is a good time to talk about it. This month, March 2002, happens to be the fortieth anniversary of the public announcement by the Kennedy administration that they were sending U.S. pilots to bomb South Vietnam, that's U.S. bombing of South Vietnam. It was the initiation of chemical warfare to destroy food crops, driving huge numbers of people into concentration camps. Nobody was there except the U.S. and the South Vietnamese. And it was a U.S. war against South Vietnam, publicly announced. Not a peep of protest. You know, the war went on for years before a protest developed. But by the time it did, not just the antiwar movement, the Civil Rights movement, and other rising movements changed the popular consciousness. The country just became a lot more civilized. No American president could possibly dream of doing that today.

The same is true in many other areas. Go back to '62, there was no feminist movement, there was a very limited human rights movement, extremely limited. There was no environmental movement, meaning rights of our grandchildren. There were no Third World solidarity movements. There was no anti-apartheid movement. There was no anti-sweat shop movement. I mean, all of the things that we take for granted just weren't there. How did they get there? Was it a gift from an angel? No, they got there by struggle, common struggle by people who dedicated themselves with others, because you can't do it alone, and made it a much more civilized country. It was a long way to go, and that's not the first time it happened. And it will continue.

I gather it's your belief that when we focus on heroes in the movement, that's a mistake, because it's really the unsung heroes, the unsung seamstresses or whatever in this movement, who actually make a difference.

They're the ones, yes. Take, say, the Civil Rights movement. When you think of the Civil Rights movement, the first thing you think of is Martin Luther King. King was an important figure. But he would have been the first to tell you, I'm sure, that he was riding the wave of activism, that people who were doing the work, who were in the lead in the Civil Rights movement, were young SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] workers, freedom riders, people out there in the streets every day getting beaten and sometimes killed, working constantly. They created the circumstances in which a Martin Luther King could come in and be a leader. His role was extremely important, I'm not denigrating it, it was very important to have done that. But the people who were really important are the ones whose names are forgotten. And that's true of every movement that ever existed.

If students were to watch or read this interview, how would you advise them to prepare for the future if they identify with the goals that you are putting on the table?

Be honest, critical, accept elementary moral principles. For example, the principle that if something is wrong for others, it's wrong for us. Things like that. Understand the importance of the fundamental anarchist principle, namely, prior illegitimacy of power and violence, unless you can justify it, which is not easy. It's their burden of proof, not yours. And that's true whether it's personal relations in a family, and whether it's international affairs. Beyond that, try to join with others who share your interests to learn more and to act responsively to improve the many very serious problems of the world, which can be done.

There's an important element of courage in this kind of work, is there not? And what is involved in that courage?

In a country like the United States, the level of courage that's involved is extremely low. If you're a poor black organizer in the slums, yes, it takes courage, because you can get killed. If you're a relatively well-off, educated white person, the level of courage is minuscule. I mean, just see what other people face elsewhere. Like I said, I just came back from Turkey. The people in the southeast living in a dungeon, millions of them, show real courage when they wear Kurdish colors, or speak open Kurdish as a language. They can end up in a Turkish prison or worse, and that's not fun. But let's even go to Istanbul, more Western. I actually went there for a political trial. The government was putting on trial a publisher who had published a couple of sentences of mine on repression of the Kurds. Well, in Istanbul, the leading writers -- journalists, artists, intellectuals, and others -- are constantly carrying out civil disobedience. When I was there, they purposely co-published a book of banned writings, writings of people in jail which are banned. Co-published it. They went to the prosecutor -- I went with them -- demanding to be prosecuted. That's no joke. Some of them have been in jail; some will go back to jail. They face repression, but they're not making a big fuss about it, they just do it in their normal behavior, and not waving flags and saying, "Look how courageous I am." That's just life. That takes courage.

As compared with what they face every day, what we face is so pathetically small that we shouldn't even be talking about it. Yes, unpleasant things can happen, but not in comparison with what goes on in the world.

Coming out of science and the level of complexity in your field of linguistics, I'm curious as to whether this accounts for what I think I detect is a moderate or almost conservative view on your part of how much things can change in the short term. I don't know if that's a fair comment on you. But is it the case that, in some sense, by seeing so much you understand that very little sometimes can be accomplished, but that may be very important?

Very important. What's more, I don't think we should give up long-term visions. I agree with the factory girls in Lowell in 1850. I think wage slavery is an attack on fundamental human rights. I think those who work in the plants should own them. I think we should struggle against what was then the "new spirit of the age": gain wealth, forgetting everybody but yourself. Yes, that's all degrading and destructive, and in the long term -- I don't know how long -- it should be dismantled. But right now there are serious problems to deal with, like 30 million Americans who don't have enough to eat, or people elsewhere in the world who are far worse off, and who are, in fact, under our boot, we're grinding them into the dust. Those are short-term things that can be dealt with. There's nothing wrong with making small gains, like the gains that I was talking about before, from the sixties until today. They're extremely important for human lives. It doesn't mean that there are not a lot mountain peaks to climb, there are. But you do what's within range.

The same in the sciences. You might like to solve the problems of, say, what causes human action, but the problems you work on are the ones that are right at the edge of your understanding. There's a famous joke about a drunk under a lamppost looking at the ground, and somebody comes up and asks him "What are you looking for?" He says, "I'm looking for a pencil that I dropped." They said, "Well, where did you drop it?" He says, "Oh, I dropped it across the street." "Well, why are looking here?" "This is where the light is." That's the way the sciences work. Maybe the problem you would like to solve is across the street, but you have to work where the light is. If you try to move it a little further, maybe ultimately you'll get across the street. The same is true in human affairs. I think the same is true in personal relations. You have problems with your kids, that's the way you have to deal with it.

One final question, and I understand your unwillingness to focus on heroes or to be made into a hero, but if an activist is watching or reading this interview, what lesson might they draw from your life about what they can do in their life, with regard to the issues that are of concern to them?

Last night I gave a talk in Berkeley to a big mob of people about U.S. and the Middle East, and Israel and Palestine, and Turkey, and these things. Who is responsible for that talk? Not me. I flew in from Boston, came over and gave a talk. The people responsible for that are the people working on it, the people working day after day to create the organizational structures, the support systems, to go up and back to work with oppressed people over there. Maybe their names won't enter some record, but they're the ones who are leading everything. I come in and it's a privilege for me to be able to join them for an hour, but that's easy. You know, get up and give a talk, it's no big deal. Working on it day after day, all the time, that's hard, and that's important, and that's what changes the world, not somebody coming in and giving a talk.

Noam, thank you very much for joining us today. It was a fascinating discussion of at least some aspects of your life and your work. Thank you.

Thank you.

And thank you very much for joining us for this Conversation with History.